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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
December 1, 1978 Conference
~No. 78-432-CFX

.14--L.A-

~- ~

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA

v.

No.78-435-CFX

~•

~

~~

Federal/Civil

k

WEBER, e t a 1.

Timely by extension

?v~~~~

KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORP. 1

v.

Cert to CA 5 (Gee & Fay;
Wisdom, dissenting)

7k._..6lc__ ~~ ~ ~~

WEBER, et al.

.

~

~~M.J_.Lo ~~

List 1, Sheet 2
~

e

~~~

-

Same

,m~~~~~
~I.e_. ~-,1-o ~
Same

-1--r...::> ~

Same

~ ~G--":;~~ L-~~..LL.....r--<...v).-11!.--'
No. 78-436-CFX

/_f~ ~~~~~~ ~

UNITED STATES OF -AMERICA & THE EQUAL
~MPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
,;

v.
WEBER, et al.

Same

Same

f

~ ~h h_~ -~---,_
~~

~

r...t~ sa;;;eQ.:Q7

'

SUMMARY.

These curve-lined cases present the question whether

a private employer voluntarily may agree with a union to adopt a
~

program to increase the number of minority employees in skilled craft
units in the employer's plants even though the employer had not previously discriminated against

mi~ority employe~s.

CA 5 held that

such a program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (d), on the ground that in the absence of
a showing that the employer previously discriminated against the
minority employees such a program constituted impermissible discrimination against non-minority employees.
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW.

In 1974 petr Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical

Corp. ("Kaiser") and petr United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC,
("USWA"), entered into a collective bargaining agreement relating to
eligibility for on-the-job training to enter craft positions at Kaiser's
plants across the country.

In an effort to increase the number of

minority craft workers the agreement removed the previous requirement
for craft experience prior to

on-the-job

training!~~ est~~lished

that for every white person given such training one minority person
would be given craft training . until the percentage of minority craft
rs at a given plant equaled the percentage of minority population in
the surrounding area.
upon

seniority~

Eligibility for craft training continued to rest

but to effectuate the minority -'1iring goals the agree-

ment established dual / seniority lists so that for each two craft unit
vacancies one trainee would be selected from the list of eligible white
employees and one from the list of eligible minority employees. This

resulted in minority employees being admitted to Kaiser's training

(

programs ahead of white employees who had greater seniority than those
..........,____------

-

.

~-----~

minority employees.
Resp Weber is a white employee of Kaiser who unsuccessfully sought
admission to a craft training program at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy,
Louisiana.

After minority employees who enjoyed less seniority than

Weber and other white employees were admitted to training programs at
the Gramerc y plant ahead of Weber and the other white workers, Weber
1

brought suit in the ED La. (Gordon, DJ) on his own hehalf and the behalf
of the non-minority employees at the Gramercy plant who were eligible
to apply for on-the-job craft training after the adoption of the
affirmative action agreement.

The suit, brought against petrs Kaiser

and USWA, alleged that the agreement established a quota plan that
impermissibly discriminated against non-minority employees in violation
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) & (d), §§ 703 (a) & (d) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After a trial on resps' request for
a permanent injunction restraining petrs from enforcing the affirmative
action agreement the DC found that the evidence introduced at trial
showed that Kaiser and USWA had agreed upon a minority goal of 39%
of the craft force at Gramercy.

This figure was based on the desire

of petrs to raise the minority percentage at the plant, which stood
at 14.8% of the total force, to a level near the 40% minority p6pulation
of the parishes surrounding the Gramercy works.

The DC found that the

evidence established that Kaiser had not discriminated against minority
applicants for employment since the Gramercy plant had opened in 1958

/

and that since 1969 the company had hired new employees on a "one
white, one black" basis.

Moreover, the DC found that though the

percentage of minority workers in the cra'f t force was only 2-2 1/2%
prior to 1974 1

Kaiser had made vigorous efforts to secure trained

minority employees for the craft units until
agreement here at issue.
had its intended effect at

the adoption of the

The DC also found that the 1974 agreement
Gramercy of admitting minority em-

ployees to craft training programs who possessed less seniority than
white employees who sought admission to the same programs.
The DC stated that the 1974 agreement had been adopted not only
on account of the desire of Kaiser to increase the percentage of
skilled minority employees but also out of the company's concern
about compliance with the regulations issued by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance ("OFCC"), an agency of the Executive branch of
the U.S. government.

The DC stated also that there was no evidence

that Kaiser had adopted the 1974 agreement in order to correct any
ef~ects

of past discrimination in any of its plants.

To the contrary,

the DC found that none of the employees who had been offered training
opportunities over more senior white employees under the 1974 agreement
had been discriminated against by Kaiser.
On the basis of these findings the DC held the 1974 agreement L9-~

to extend preferential treatment solely on the basis of
to be in violation of Title VII.

race

-

~ r~fil

~

It rejected Kaiser's

argument that voluntary plans such as the one here at issue were
permissible since the federal courts frequently had imposed similar

plans to effectuate the purposes of Title VII.

Though the DC recog-

nized the power of the federal courts to fashion affirmative action
programs in the proper circumstances it held this did not warrant
similar voluntary action since, while Title VII forbade discrimination
by employers, it did not prohibit the courts from discriminating
against employees in fashioning appropriate remedies.

Moreover, the

DC stated, the courts alone were in the position to fashion remedies
tailored to the specifics of each situation and designed to protect
the rights of all parties involved.

And only the courts properly could

administer such remedies to protect the rights of the parties while
effectuating the purposes of the Act.
Second, the DC held that even if petrs were correct in arguing
that employers could discriminate on the basis of race in some circumstances, such discrimination was improper here since there had been
no showing of past discrimination against the minority employees here
involved by the defendants here involved.

Because the DC found the

evidence to have established that the minority employees who benefitted
from the 1974 agreement had never themselves been the victims of discrimination during hiring it held that any plan--court-ordered or voluntary-that adopted other than a plant-wide seniority system violated Title
VII. Accordingly, the DC permanently enjoined enforcement of the 1974
agreement at

Kaise~'s

Gramercy plant.

CA 5 affirmed, Judge Wisdom dissenting.

The CA disagreed with

~

the DC's view that only the courts could fashion affirmative action
remedie~

finding

that voluntary compliance was an integral part

of Title VII's enforcement scheme.

It did not find it necessary to

explore this question, however, since it aJ!irmed the

r·

__'"'-.......-.....---.._------------·-

~C's

judgment

solely on the ground that no showing of past discrimination had been
....._

-

made.

· - ----

In the absence of such proof, the CA stated, a racial quota

loses its character as an equitable remedy and became

a racial preference prohibited by Title VII.

unlawful as

Nor did the CA find

that the 1974 agreement was justifiable as an attempt to correct
past societal discrimination, as opposed to employment discrimination.
Here, the court held,
unskilled.

all of the applicants for training were

Since

there had been no discrimination in hiring there
the
was no basis to find that/agreement was designed to remedy discrimination that had occurred outside the plant.
ms at issue.

Only the effect of seniority

"Where admissions to the craft on-the-job training pro-

grams are admittedly and purely functions of seniority and that seniority is untainted by prior discriminatory acts," the CA wrote, "the
fo!-one

ratio~

one~

whether designed by agreement between Kaiser and USWA

or by order of court, has no foundation in restorative justice, and its
preference for training minority workers thus violates Title VII."

Petn

in No. 78-432, at 36a.
CA 5 then considered the effect of Executive Order 11246, which

-----------------------------___
___

requires all applicants for federal
contracts to refrain from employ-.""
_.......__.
ment discrimination and to take affirmative action to ensure that all
persons

are employed and treated without regard to race.

The CA found

'that to the extent this order authorized any affirmative action programs
proscribed by Title VII the order was invalid in light of direct congressional prohibition on racial quotas contained in Title VII.

Judge Wisdom dissented.

First, he argued that the majority, by re-

quiring proof of past discrimination, had proscribed any voluntary plan
complianc
that a court could not have imposed. This standard would deter_-.voluntary;
since employers could not be expected to take the risk of guessing
how a particular court would come out in any given situation.

Judge

Wisdom instead argued that "[i]f an affirmative action plan, adopted
in a collective bargaining agreement, is a reasonable remedy for an
arguable violation of Title VII, it should be upheld."
78-432, at 45a-46a.

Petn in No.

Application of this standard in this case, he

reasoned, would have resulted in reversal.

There were at

~ast

three

-

arguable violations of Title VII revealed by the record, he argued.

First, the statistical evidence showing that only 14.8% of Kaiser's
work force was black while the surrounding parishes were nearly 40%
black established a prima facie case of discrimination that was not
rebutted.

Second, the requirement that employees have prior crafts

experience to enter the training programs may have violated Title VII
if the employer could not have established a business necessity defense.
Third, the requirement of training for any craft job conceivably was
impermissible, at least in the absence of any proffered justification
for the requirement.

Moreover, Judge Wisdom would have found the

1974 agreement reasonable on the grounds

it was adopted by a union

with a duty of fair representation to its membership, most of which
is white; it had only limited impact on white workers since none lost
their positions and none previously eligible for craft training were
affected by the agreement; and

it allowed significant white parti-

cipation •
Second, Judge Wisdom argued that reversal was required on the
'

ground that the 1974 agreement was a proper response to societal
discrimination.
from volunteering

He asserted that employers should not be deterred
to prefer employees who, for whatever

reasons, had faced discrimination.

And he stated that since discrimina-

tion against blacks had been so egregious and recent in the crafts
it was permissible to adopt such preferences on a racial basis
so long as the preferences were reasonable.
Third, Judge Wisdom contended that a basis for upholding the 1974
agreement was that it complied with Executive Order 11246.

Even if

Title VII prohibited petrs' plan, Judge Wisdom reasoned, C0 ngress
had indicated that it viewed affirmative action plans as permissible
under

E.O. 11246 regardless of the provisions of Title VII when it

rejected attempts to transfer enforcement of that order to the EEOC
and rejected a proposal to amend Title VII to state expressly that
E.O. 11246 could not be used as authority for affirmative action programs .
---- Because the DC had not considered this issue in its opinion, however,
Judge Wisdom would have remanded on this point for further

proceedings

with regard to the relation between the 1974 agreement and E.O. 11246.
CONTENTIONS.

In No. 78-432, USWA urges the Court to grant reopen
view to settle the important issue--left 1
in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp: Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 (1976)--of whether voluntary

affirmative actions programs such as the one here at issue are permissible
Petr USWA argues that the judgment of CA 5 in this case has placed in
jeopardy a number of such programs around the country in a variety of

industries.

The

affirmative action agreements negotiated by USWA

alone, it argues, affect nearly a million employees
of the economy.

~n

majQr sectors

Indeed, petr points out, the affirmative action

program established by consent decree in the basic steel industry
in United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826
(CA 5 1975), is being reexamined by the DC in which the consent decree
was entered in light of the judgment herein.

Petr USWA also notes

that the question here presented was not resolved by the Court in

(

Regents of the U. of Calif.v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).

That case

involved action by a public entity and so implicated constitutional
concerns not here at issue and involved also Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, a provision not here applicable.

Nor will resolu-

tion of the issues presented in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, No.
77-1553, cert. granted June 19, 1978, affect the issues here presented,
petr says.

Davis involves the imposition of quotas by a court, not the

voluntary adoption of

quotas by private parties.

Kaiser has filed a petn for cert in No. 78-435.

It argues that,

as Judge Wisdom realized, the judgment of CA 5 will put an end to
voluntary compliance with affirmative action mandates of Title VII
and E.O. 11246.

Kaiser believes that the racial preferences incorpora-

ted into its 1974 agreement are indispensable to ending the exclusion
of minority workers from the crafts jobs here at issue and that judicial
resources are insufficient to allow the courts effectively to police
tqe ending of discrimination in this area in every industry.

Kaiser

notes that few employers will be willing to admit past discrimination

in light of the liability to which such admissions could expose them,
but that CA 5's holding makes such an admission a prerequisite to the
establishment of a valid voluntary affirmative action system.
over, Kaiser argues, the 1974 agreement is consistent with

More-

the views

of a majority of this Court as expressed in Bakke in that the racial
classification can be justified as necessary to effectuate the interest
in insuring against discrimination and the interest in assuring that
all available segments of the labor pool are utilized.

This latter

interest, Kaiser believes, is comparable to the school's interest
in maintaining a diverse student body recognized in Bakke.
Kaiser also contends that CA 5's decision conflicts with the
judgment of CA 8 in Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (1971)(in
bane), cert denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).

In that case, Kaiser believes,

CA 8 held that .Title VII did not necessarily require proof that the
minority persons to whom preferential treatment was to be afforded
had been the victims of discrimination.

Similarly, in EEOC v. AT&T,

556 F.2d 167 (CA 3 1977), cert. denied, 46 USLW 3803 (1978), CA 3
found that E.O. 11246 was sufficient in and of itself to justify
class-wide relief rather than only relief directed at individual victims
of discrimination, while in this case CA 5 took a narrower view of
the executive order's scope.

Moreover, at least three CAs

*

have adopted

the view that E.O. 11246 allows the establishment of affirmative action
programs in the absence of any findings that the specific employers at

*

Southern Ill. Bldrs. Assoc v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (CA 7 1972);
Assoc. General Contractors, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (CA 1 1973),
cert denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvan i
v. Schultz, 442 F.2d 159 (CA 3), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).

issue ever discriminated against minority employees.

Rather, those

courts, argues Kaiser, looked to the fact that minorities were substantially underrepresented among the skilled workers hired by the employers
and that such underrepresentation resulted from the historical exclusion of minority workers from the building trades.

Under the view

adopted by these courts, Kaiser asserts, the 1974 agreement would have
been upheld.

I

The United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

both represented by the SG, have filed the petn in No. 78-436.

The

SG argues that the judgment below will end voluntary compliance since

no employer will admit Title VII violations in - order to institute an
affirmative action program.
tive action programs

He claims that Title VII permits affirma-----------.__
-- '
by an employer and a union that have

-

~

a reasonable basis to believe that a plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case of employment discrimination with respect to the plant in
question.

Such a test would be consonant with the emphasis placed on

voluntary compliance by Congress, the SG says, and would avoid the
expense, delay, and rancor often associated with employment litigation.
In this case, the SG continues, there was ample evidence upon which
petrs Kaiser and USWA could have believed that a plaintiff might
have succeeded in a Title VII action.

Given the limited scope of

the 1974 agreement and its slight impact on non-minority employees,
the SG believes it was a reasonable response to the situation.

More-

over, the SG states, E.O. 11246 imposed an affirmative action obligation on petrs that support the 1974 agreement's lawfulness.

As Judge

7?

Wisdom noted in his dissent, the SG points out, the legislative history
of Title VII indicates that Congress did not mean to restrict the
employers to comply with the mandate of E.O. 11246.

ability of

The DC here found that Kaiser instituted the 1974 agreement largely
out of concern with the regulations issued by the OFCC under the
order.

Since it is not €lear from the record whether the 19 7'.4 agree-

ment is consistent with E.O. 11246, however, the SG urges that this
question be referred to the DC on remand.
The SG then asserts that though he believes the judgment below
~

to be erroneous, and ordinarily_would warrant review by the Court,
the case should be GVR'd for reconsideration in li E!_9f BAkke.
~

-Bakke's

discussion of Title VII and of the kind of factual showings that are
relevant to cases such as this one would, the SG says, enable the
CA to dispose of the case on narrower grounds.

The SG notes in this

regard that the record as it now stands does not reveal the actions
of the OFCC in 1971 and 1973 with regard to Kaiser's on-the-job training
programs.

Since Bakke teaches that the

~egality

of an affirmative action

program may turn on the presence o£ government findings and government
~rticipation,

the SG argues, the record should be reopened on remand

for a determination of whether a government body charged with responsibility in the area of discrimination made findings of past discrimination :
Remand would also permit one of the parties or perhaps an intervener
to prove prior discrimination against blacks at the plant at Gramercy.
Accordingly, the SG urges the Court to GVR because of the importance and
relevance of Bakke and the need to supplement the record.
* The SG has lodged with the Clerk OFCC documents that he believes support his thesis that petrs undertook the 1974 in reaction to OFCC proddin

Resp Weber has filed one response in answer to the three petns.
He urges the Court to deny cert. on the ground that · the judgment below
is consistent with the express meaning of Title VII and with the
decisions of this Court holding that Title VII was "designed to make
race irrelevant in the employment market."

City of Los Angeles, Dept.

of Water & Power v. Manhart, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1376 (1978).

Second,

he.argues that the judgment below is consistent with the decision of
this Court in Bakke since the factors tending to support the program
·-~ 7
w~
~~

· upheld in Bakke are not present here.

Third, resp argues that the

Court should allow the law in this area to develop in light of Bakke
before deciding another decision in this area.
If the Court does decide to grant cert., resp urges it to con'

fine itself to the only question presented by the judgment below, i.e.,
the propriety of a voluntary plan in the absence of any proof of past
) discrimination.
argues.

The SG's request for a remand is unwarranted, resp

First, there is no need for the DC to consider the effect of

E.O. 11246 since if the 1974 agreement violates Title VII, the fact
that the agreement complies with the order is irrelevant.
there is no need for reconsideration in light of Bakke.
no new prinicples of law relevant to this case.

Second,
Bakke decided

And, resps says, it

is clear that petrs formulated their 1974 plan to avoid government involvement, not because of it.

There is no evidence justifying a remand

to determine the extent of government involvement in the adoption of
the agreement, says resp, and the documents lodged by the SG with the
Court do not establish to the contrary.

Petr USWA has filed a Memorandum in opposition to the
for a GVR.

~u·s

requesc

USWA argues that the record fairly and adequately presents

the question whether the 1974 voluntary agreement is permissible in
the absence of any proof of past discrimination.

It

a~gues

that the

SG seeks to convert the case on remand into one dealing with the issue
of the government's power to compel affirmative action remedies upon
a prima facie showing of past discrimination.

That issue is not fairly

before the Court, petr states, and it urges the Court to reach the
question decided by CA 5 which is.
•

Two briefs amicus curiae have been filed supporting petrs, one by
one
the Equal Employment Advisory C0 uncil, an employers' group, and /by the
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center and a number of civil rights organizations.
DISCUSSION.

The judgment below clearly raises questions of

importanc.e concerning the scope of voluntary affirmative action
programs.

Given the importance attached to voluntary compliance

with the Civil Rights Act by Congress, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,

415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974), the - judgment below may have gone too

far.

Petrs' argument that few companies will run the risk of admiting
. --~--------------------------past discrimination in order to establish an affirmative action plan

~

since such admissions would expose them to liability under Title VII
seems sound.

Moreover, any employer that did admit past discrimination

would also run the risk of suits by non-minority employees claiming
that there had been no past discrimination sufficient to support the
establishment ef a racial preference program.

Further, the affirmative

action plan here at issue was limited in scope and in its effect on
white employees.

Moreover, it was negotiated by a union with a· majority

of white members.

In light of these factors, CAS's judgment appears

unduly restrictive of

This Court has not considered

the permissible scope of voluntary plans under Title ·vii instituted by
private employers and this case therefore may present a vehicle in
which to do so.

In addition, the relationship between E.O. 11246 and

Title VII appears never to have been addressed.

---.

-

-"--

--------~---

In light of the ex-

pansive affirmative action obligation imposed by the E.O., the
effect of that order in the circumstances of this case would appear
also to raise a substantial question.
Few other courts have considered the precise issue of voluntary
affirmative action programs, however, and the Court might choose to
wait until other courts have explored this area in light of the
de.cision last term in Bakke.

See Detroit Police Officers Ass 'n v. Young,

446 F.Supp. 979, 1004 (ED Mich 1978)(striking down voluntary plan; follows
CAS's approach).

In this regard, it should be noted that petr Kaiser

does not appear correct in arguing that the judgment below is in conflict with the judgments of other circuits.

The cases upon which

Kaiser relies, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, supra, 452 F.2d, at 330,
all rested upon findings of past discrimination in the industry or by
the union involved.
Should the Court believe the issue important, however, there would
appear to be no reason to follow the SG's recommendation to GVR.

The

SG argues that a remand would allow the record to be supplemented to
determine if the 1974 agreement was adopted as a result of findings and

recommendations made by the OFCC, and to this end it has lodged two

(

documents with the Clerk purporting to demonstrate the likelihood that
such

'

government involvement could be shown.

There is no evidence

to this effect in the record, however, and the generalized documents
lodged by the SG show only that the government made observations and
recommendations to Kaiser with regard to. minority hiring, but not that
the OFCC made findings of past discrimination or specific recommendations
that a certain type of on-the-job program be adopted.

Nor is there

any evidence to support the SG's thesis that a remand would permit
the introduction of evidence establishing past

discrimination.

DC specifically found that no such evidence existed.

The

And in light

of the Court's division in Bakke and the fact that Bakke dealt with
significantly different issues the value of a remand for reconsideration
in light of that case appears questionable.
There is one response to all three petns.
Grant.

11/22/78

McDaniel

opn in petn

MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:

RE:

DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul

united ·steelworkers v. Weber, No. 78-432; Kaiser ·Aluminum
&·chemical ·corp; v. Weber, No. 78-435; united ·states v.
Weber, NO. 7B 4~6

D-......_k., :tt::\J \"11'&
You have asked me to take another look at this case in

light of the availability of only eight justices to hear ~
~

;t

In particular you are concerned whether you would be

inclined to affirm the court below, thus setting the stage for a
likely 4-4 split.

I have qone over the opinions below and the

various filings with an eye toward the problems presented by

McDonald v. santa · Fe ·Trails ·Transportation ·co;, 427 u.s. 273

. '

·,
..
~

2.

(1976), and your opinion in Bakke.

As I have told you, I

approach this case with perhaps an excess of concern about the
dangers and undesirability of reverse discrimination, but I have
tried to put this bias aside and to present both sides of this
difficult case.

On balance, however, I believe a real problem

exists here, as I think the likelihood of your voting to affirm
is substantial.
I

First, it is important to nail down what this case does
not involve.
only.

Petitioners were found to have violated Title VII

There is no constitutional issue here, either as a basis

for respondent's claim or as a defense.

Indeed, as there is no

state action here, the equal protection clause could not be
implicated.

Further, unlike Bakke, it is clear that the

statutory question does not implicate any constitutional issue.
Title VII, unlike Title VI, does not incorporate the
constitutional standard for discrimination.
Duke · Power · co~,

426

u.s.

u.s.

401

229 (1976).

Compare Griqqs v.

424 (1971), with washington v. Davis,

Thus this case present only a question of

statutory interpretation.

As far as I can tell, the press and

public (including several lawyers I have talked to) have missed
this point entirely.
In addition, there is a finding of fact by the district
court, affirmed by the court of appeals, that before instituting
~~....Jc.

the program under tedllrsuge here petitioners had not engaqed in
any conduct that violated Title VII.

Under the two-court rule,

then, this Court is bound to accept as given that petitioners not
------------------~~--------------~

3.

only have never been

adju~ged

guilty of discrimination, but that

~

t

•

if petitioners had been brought to trial, they would have been
found innocent of any past discrimination.

It may be, as Judge

Wisdom arqued in his dissent, that this is the wrong standard-that the question should be not whether petitioners in fact were
guilty of past discrimination, but whether they reasonably could
have believed themselves guilty.

But, to the extent the former

issue is relevant, the lower courts have resolved it against
petitioners.
II
In McDonald, supra, a unanimous Court held "that Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners
in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were
they Negroes and [their favored coworker] white."
280.

427

u.s.,

at

In a footnote aPpended to that statement, the Court

reserved the question presented by this case:
"Santa Fe disclaims that the actions challenged
here were any part of an affirmative action
program, see Brief for Respondent Santa Fe 19 n. 5,
and we emphasize that we do not consider here the
permissibility of such a program, whether
judicially required or otherwise prompted."
Id~,
at 280-281, n. 8.
To put the point somewhat narrowly, then, this case involves only
the extension of McDonald to an "otherwise prompted" affirmative
action program.
The pertinent statutory language and leqislative history
of Title VII is reviewed in McDonald, and I shall not repeat it
here.

See

id~,

at 279-280.

They indicate that Title VII forbids

"discrimination" against whites, but do not answer the question

4.

whether "affirmative action" is "discrimination."

The framework

for finding an answer to that riddle lies, I believe, in your
opinion in Bakke.

That does not end the matter, however:

Even

if an affirmative action program constitutes discrimination
against whites, it still may be possible to construe Title VII as
providing a defense when discrimination results from a good faith
affirmative action program.

I will deal with each of these

issues separately.

A

A

As I read your opinion in Bakke, it seems to indicate
fairly clearly that affirmative action, in spite of its benign
purpose, still results in racial discrimination.

The following

language seems pertinent:
"All state-imposed classifications that rearrange
burdens and benefits on the basis of race are
likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the
individuals burdened. The denial to innocent
persons of equal rights and opportunities may
outrage those so deprived and therefore may be
perceived as invidious. These individuals are
likely to find little comfort in the notion that
the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely
the price of membership in the dominant majority
and that its imposition is inspired by the
supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One
should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness
of, and the perception of mistreatment that
accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and
privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic
origin." Bakke, supra, at 25 n. 34.
(emphasis in
original).
In this case, of course, the state has not been involved in the
allocation of burdens and benefits on the basis of race:
only private discrimination is involved.

rather,

Although this is an

important distinction, I am not sure it makes a difference with

5.

respect to the point at issue.

From respondent's point of view,
'

-

it matters little that his union, rather than the government, was
responsible for creating a system that denied him promotion

---

because of his race.
One might argue that respondent may exercise a greater

political role within his union than he can within his
government, thereby lending a coloring of voluntariness to the
disadvantages imposed by the union.
unrealistic, however.

This strikes me as

This union, like many, is an enormous

organization, larger than at least some of the organs of state
and local government whose discriminatory acts would constitute
state action.

I do not see how one properly may trust this union

to act as a representative of its individual members' interests
any more than one can trust a governmental body always to serve
the needs of its constituents.
Finally, in

Bakk~

you rejected the argument that members

of the group that constitutes a majority within the entity
imposing burdens thereby do not suffer discrimination.

You

observed there:
"The concepts of 'majority' and 'minority'
necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and
political iudgments. As observed above, the white
'majority' itself is composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of
prior discrimination at the hands of the state and
private individuals. Not all of these groups can
receive preferential treatment and corresponding
judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms
of race and nationality, for then the only
'majority' left would be a new minority of White
Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled
basis for deciding which groups would merit
'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would
not."
Id;, at 26.

·.

6.

As an abstract proposition, then, I think you would regard the
kind of iniury suffered by respondent as a form of racial
discrimination which Title VII forbids.

The really difficult

question, of course, is whether Title VII should or can be
interpreted not to forbid this kind of racial discrimination in
certain circumstances, and if so what those circumstances are.
B
It seems clear that injuries of the kind Title VII

I

generally forbids are lawful if created pursuant to an
appropriate remedial purpose.

Your opinion in Bakke indicated

that the imposition of burdens as the basis of race was

permissible when the injury resulted from preferential
classifications used to remedy "proven constitutional or
statutory violations."

Id~,

at 33.

But, you went on to observe,

" [w)e have never approved a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
statutory findings."

Id~,

at 38.

In the course of your

discussion, you referred specifically to Title VII as supportinq
this limit on the remedial use of racial preferences:
"Moreover, the presumption in Griqqs-- that
disparate impact without any show1ng of business
justification established the existence of
discrimination in violation of the statute-- was
based on legislative determinations, wholly absent
here, that past discrimination had handicapped
various minority groups to such an extent that
disparate impact could be traced to identifiable
instances of past discrimination • • . • The Court
emphasized that 'the Act does not command that any
person be hired simply because he was formerly the

7.

subject of discrimination, or because he is a
member of a minority group. ' ' . • • Indeed, ~ 7 03 ( j)
of the Act makes it clear that preferential
treatment for an individual or minority group to
correct an existing 'imbalance' may not be required
under Title VII.
42 u.s.c. ~ 2000e-2(j). Thus,
Title VII principles support the proposition that
findings of identified discrimination must precede
the fashioning of remedial measures embodying
racial classifications." Id~, at 39-40, n. 44.
LM-~~
This passage in! icafes that racial preferences not based on
1\

findings of identified past discrimination are inconsistent with
Title VII.

If such preferences are inconsistent with
-follows logically that the statute creates no special

for them.

the Act, it
exemption

Consequently racial preferences by employers subject

to the Act, if not based on findings of discrimination, should
violate the Act.
There are no judicial findings to sustain the preference
at issue in this case;

indeed, both of the courts below found

that no judicial findings of discrimination could have been made.

--

The question remains whether the preference used by petitioners
can be sustained by legislative or administrative findings.

One

might draw the negative inference from§ 703(i) of Title VII,
which states that preferences for minorities are not required by
that statute, that such preferences nonetheless are permitted.
But I think this would be stretching it a bit.

The thrust of

Title VII as interpreted by this Court is entirely in the other
dir.ection:

all conduct that burdens one race more than another,
~---------------------------------------------------unless justified by employment or compensatory considerations, is

-------

prohibited.

----------------------------------------~~

The fact that § 703(i) does not expressly prohibit

minority preferences does not undercut the Act's general

8.

prohibition of racial preferences, whether majority or minority.
'

Nor, as far as I am aware, are their administrative
findings that sustain the racial preference in question.
Executive Order 11246 miqht be considered an administrative
determination of some sort, but only with qreat difficulty may
one construe it to approve Kaiser's program.

The Order does

require federal contractors, including Kaiser, "to take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated

duri~g

employment, without regard to

their race, color, religion, sex or national oriqin."

§

202(j).

On its face this regulation would appear to forbid what Kaiser
has done, namely treating employees with reqard to race during
employment.

As far as I know, the Office of Federal Contract

Compliance, which has the responsibility for enforcing this
regulation, has not in turn issued any regulations to the
contrary.

And in Bakke, you observed, "Every decision upholding

the requirement of preferential hiring under Executive Order
11246 has emphasized the existence of previous discrimination as
a predicate for the imposition of a preferential remedy."

Bakke,

supra, at 32 n. 40.
Judge Wisdom's dissent identifies another interest which
might be construed to limit Title VII's prohibition of racial
preferences.

As he observed, Title VII seeks to promote

voluntary conciliation of discrimination claims.

The decision of

the court below creates an impediment to that policy, at least
where the satisfaction of claims involves disadvantaging nonclaimants.

He proposed as an accomodation of Title VII's

9.

conciliation policy the creation of a "zone of reasonableness" to
provide employers and unions with a safe harbor:

"If an

affirmative action plan, adopted in a collective bargaining
agreement, is a reasonable remedy for an arguable violation of
Title VII, it should be upheld."

Pet. App. at 45a-46a.

Your opinion in Bakke reiected the argument that
institutions without governmental supervision could seek to
redress "societal" discrimination,

id~,

at 26-27, n. 36, but you

did not address whether institutions could seek to remedy their
own past misdeeds.

When an employer knows he has violated the

Act and seeks to eliminate the problem, it might not make sense
to punish him because he did not wait for a complaint to be
filed.

The question presented here, however, is what happens

under Title VII when an employer turns out to be wrong in
believing he had misdeeds to correct.
The arguments in favor of Judge Wisdom's position seem
clear.

If a safe harbor does not exist, then employers will be

discouraged from voluntary efforts to remedy past violations.
More litigation would result, clogging already crowded dockets.
To avoid liability for back pay and attorneys' fees, employers
would dig in their heels, leaving some past wrongs uncorrected.
The goal of eliminating discrimination will be frustrated and
delayed.
There are strong arguments, however, for not according
employers such leeway.

First, and perhaps foremost, I can find

nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or its
administrative interpretation that can serve as a source for this

t

1 0.

"zone of reasonableness" standard.

What Judge Wisdom seeks to do

is to create by judicial interpolation a special defense to

-------

--------------statutory
liability. ---------------Were this a constitutional

-~

case, that

technique would be acceptable and even desirable, but there is
less room for judicial creativity of this sort in the
interpretation of a statute.
Second, I am not sure Judqe Wisdom accurately identified
the voluntary compliance policy Title VII actually embodies.

As

I understand it, Title VII's voluntary conciliation process is
supposed to take place under the auspices of, and to be
supervised by, the EEOC.
altogether.

Here petitioners avoided the EEOC

I am not sure that Title VII can be said to promote

completely unsupervised settlement of claims.
Third, the concept of voluntary conciliation assumes
that all parties are represented in the agreement.

I am not

entirely comfortable with the notion that the union can bind
respondent to a program that disadvantages him on account of his
race.

As I indicated above, we do not permit governments, which

also are representative entities, to discriminate against their
citizens.

One of the principal reasons why governments are

denied this power is a belief, which runs through all of this
Court's modern race decisions, that the political process is an
inadequate check on the dangers presented by racial
discrimination.

I think a respectable argument can be made for

the proposition that racial discrimination also is too serious a
matter to be left to intra-union politics.
Fourth, the test Proposed by Judge Wisdom is a two-edged

11•

sword.

It would permit employers who perceived an imbalance in

their work force in favor of particular racial groups to
institute, without judicial or administrative approval, programs
that niscriminate against those groups.

To take a not too far-

fetched example, the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority,
which, we learned in Beazer, employs a disproportionately high
number of blacks and Puerto Ricans, might start giving
preferences to white applicants.

Under Judge Wisdom's standard,

the Transit Authority could use these preferences even if the
racial imbalance among its employees was entirely legitimate, as
long as it reasonably could have believed that an arguable
violation of Title VII had occurred.

Instances where this test

could be use to shield programs discriminating against women
probably are plentiful--

my intuitive iudgment is that quite a

few institutions of higher education would be free to stop hiring
or promoting women professors altogether.
There is an argument that Judge Wisdom did not make, but
might be inferred from his opinion.

He apparently would have

limited his holding to affirmative action programs produced by
collective bargaining.

From the employer's point of view, it

does not matter whether a union ratifies affirmative action-his concern is simply to eliminate any potential violation before
being brought to court.

Union participation, however, implicates

another important federal policy-collective bargaining process.

the protection of the

There is embedded in federal

labor policy a strong concern for promoting collective
bargaining, even at the expense of individual employee interests.

12.

Ordinarily particular employees cannot come in and attack an
agreement as favoring other members of the bargaining unit at
their expense.

It is assumed that a union may distribute

unevenly benefits and burdens among the employees it represents,
and that flexibility in this regard is essential to a union's
ability to reach an accomodation with an employer.

Respondent's

claim falls into that class of complaints which are disfavored-he is attacking a portion of a collective bargaining agreement
because it favors other employees over him.

Thus federal labor

policy might constitute an independent ground for relieving
petitioners from Title VII liability.
There are, however, persuasive (at least for me)
arguments cutting against this approach.

Title VII in a way is

an exception to the general federal labor policy.

It forbids one

way of distributing benefits among employees, namely along racial
lines.

Section 703(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§

2000e-2(c),

expressly forbids a labor union from causing or attempting "to
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in
violation of this section."

In short, there is no exemption to

Title VII for collective bargaining.
III
In light of the above, I believe the decision of the
court below would be consistent with the views you have expressed
previously and that reversal, at least at first blush, would be
inconsistent with these views.

I by no means intend to suggest

that the question is closed, or that a good opinion could not be
written to support either result.

What I hope I have done is to

1 3.

have fleshed out some of the problems that must be confronted in
deciding this case.

----- -

A decision by this Court affirming the court below

probably would have an immediate impact of greater proportion
')f.

thaA an outright affirmance in Bakke would have had.

Because a

prima facie case is easier to prove under Title VII, the
potential class of reverse discrimination plaintiffs under this
statute probably is larger than those who may bring
constitutional claims.

Congress, of course, can ameliorate this

problem by modifying the statute, but the chances of disruption
and increased litigation are substantial.

---

mischief.

A____,
reversal, however, also could create considerable
Unless the Court were to overrule McDonald, any

limitation of Title VII created to accomodate affirmative action
programs would have to be constructed so as also to accomodate
racial preferences that harm minorities or women.

The immediate

threat probably is not as great as that presented by an
affirmance, but over time the harm might be even more pernicious.
Further, the underlying problem of reverse discrimination would
not be resolved:

persons in respondent's position still will

have constitutional claims to press.
These considerations orobably do not add anything to the
legal question presented by this case, but they do indicate the
importance of the issue presented.

I probably have raised more

problems in this memo than I have solved.
ready to look further into these questions.

I of course stand
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
The concern expressed briefly at Conference as to
the ~ossibility of a "four-four" division, with John not
part1cipating, has loomed larger in my mind with further
thinking about the issue present~d in these cases.
CAS. held (Wisdom, J., dissenting) that petitioners
had violated Title VII by an affirmative action program that
discriminated against whites. No constitutional issue is
presented, either as a basis for respondent's claim or as a
defense.
Indeed, in the absence of state action the Equal
Protection Clause is not implicated. The case thus presents
only a question of statutory interpretation, but a question
that will have far-reaching consequences however we may
resolve it.
The affirmative action program comes to us as
having been adopted voluntarily pursuant to collective
bargaining, and therefore has the support both of management
and the union. There is a finding of fact by the District
Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners
had not engaged in any prior conduct that violated Title
VII. Thus, unlike cases we have considered before, the
affirmative action program has not been adopted to remedy
judicially or legislatively found past discrimination.
Indeed, I suppose - in cases like this - neither management
nor the union would wish to confess past discrimination as
this could invite suits for backpay and damages.
The case therefore presents rather starkly the
question whether an affirmative action program for the

2.

benefit of minorities constitutes discrimination against
whites that is forbidden by Title VII.
It is clear beyond
doubt, I suppose, that management and the union could not
have adopted such a program for the benefit of whites.
I
recall - as perhaps a not too far fetched example - what the
record showed in Beazer where New York Metropolitan Transit
Authority employeJ a substantially disproportionately higher
number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans than the population
percentages would justify. I doubt if a program designed to
correct this "imbalance" could pass muster.
Moreover, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails
Transporation Co., we held unan1mous!y ~tfiat T1t!e VII
proh1b1ts rac1al discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be
applicable were they Negroes • • • • " 427 u.s., at 280. We
were careful in McDonald, however, to reserve the question
presented by the present case.
See note 8 at pp. 280-281.
Although I have not examined the legislative history with
this question in mind, it can be argued that an affirmative
action program does not constitute the type of
discrimination proscribed by Title VII, particularly where
the program is the result of collective bargaining. Perhaps
support for this argument could be inferred from the
government's consistent encouragement of such programs, a
policy certainly tolerated by Congress. On the other hand,
from the viewpoint of the respondent in this case (or of
anyone similarly situated), I suppose it matters little
whether the denial of benefits accorded other persons
similarly situated except for race, is occasioned by a
program characterized as "affirmative action" rather than by
isolated acts of discrimination. Nor would it make any
practical difference to respondent whether the denial of the
benefit resulted from joint action by his employer and
union, rather than by government.
I emphasize at this point that although I have
done a good deal more reading and thinking since the
Conference than before I voted to grant, I am far from being
at rest on the issue. At the time of our Conference, I was
inclined to believe that CAS had decided the case
erroneously.
I am now not at all sure that this would be my
ultimate judgment.
But I am now persuaded that it would be unwise to
have tbis case argued before a Court with less than all

.

. --· ..

--

3.

nine of us sitting. Affirmance by an evenly divided Court
would result in a period of distinct uncertainty as to the
status of voluntary affirmative action programs in the
absence of past discrimination.
The Court also might fairly be subject to
criticism for taking the case with knowledge that a Justice
could not particip3te. I therefore raise the question
whether we should reexamine our decision to grant this case.

t. 1-. (J,
L.F.P., Jr.
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benefit of minorities constitutes discrimination against
whites that is forbidden by Title VII. It is clear beyond
doubt, I suppose, that manaqernent and the union could not
have adopted such a program for the benefit of whites. I
recall - as perhaps a not too far fetched example - what the
record showed in Beazer where New York Metropolitan Transit
Authority employed a substantially disproportionately higher
number of Negroes and Puerto Ricans than the population
percentages would justify. I doubt if a proqram designed to
correct this "imbalance" could pass muster.
Moreover, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails
Transporation Co., we held unan1mous!y "Efiat T1tle VII
prohibits raciaf discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be
applicable were they Negroes • • • • " 427 u.s., at 280. We
were careful in McDonald, hnw~ver, to reserve the question
presented by the present case. See note 8 at pp. 280-281.
Although I have not P.xamined the legislative history with
this question in mind, it can be argued that an affirmative
action program does not constitute the type of
discrimination proscribed by Title VII, particularly where
the program is the result of collective baraaininq. Perhaps
supPort for this argument could be inferred from the
government's consi~tent encouraqement of such programs, a
policy certainly tolerated by Congress. On the other hand,
from thP viewpoint of the respondent in thi~ case (or of
anyone similarly situated), I suppose it matters little
whether the denial of benefits accorded othPr persons
similarly situated excePt for race, is occasioned by a
proqram characterized as "affirmative action" rather than by
isolated acts of discrimination. Nor would it make any
practical difference to respondent whether the denial of the
benefit resulted from joint action by his employer and
union, rather than by government.
I emphasize at this point that althouqh I have
done a good deal more readinq and thinking since the
Conference than before I voted to qrant, I am far from beinq
at rest on the issue. At the time of our Conference, I was
inclined to believe that CAS had decided the case
erroneously. I am now not at all sure that this would be my
ultimate judgment.
But I am now persuad~d that it would be unwise to
have this case argued before a Court with less than all
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nine of us sitting. Affirmance by an evenly divided Court
would result in a period of distinct uncert a inty as to the
status of voluntary affirmative action programs in the
absence of past discrimination.
The Court also might fairly be subject to
criticism for taking the case with knowledge that a Justice
could not participate. I therefore raise the question
whether we should reexamine our decision to grant this case.
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them in the past. How forceful the encourageGetting Allan Bakke into medical school was
ment was for Kaiser is not known; all that can be
by no means .the end of reverse disCrimination
said for sure is that the company had not been
as a courtroom . issue in the United States. There
_are any number of _other categories of economic · · aroused of discrimination in any of its personnel
policies before setting up its quotas.
·and social advantage where race or sex or ethnic
And now EEOC lawyers have f.iled a brief with ·
origin mightmake a difference and neither law
the Supreme Court urging a decision that would,
-D.or poticy has 'caught up with all of them. Furin effect, remove all such "voluntary" programs
thermore, l1S rules proliferate, right can collide
f.rom the threat of reverse discrimination suits.
· with right and compliance with one ediat lead to
They
want the latest EEOC guidelines to be
-violation of another.
.
recognized
at the highest legal level as "the
:;..:The Sears complaint dr~atized some of the
proper standard" for all hiring, training and
.. possibilitieS. The g-iant company's suit ~gai1;1st
promoting. The guidelines suggest legal im·.the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ·.a lleged ·that the government hiring' and firing . munity for sex and race quotas set up voluntarily .
by employers who have "reasonable" fears of
' strictur~ of a few years ago prevent compliance being charged with bias.
·
.with the latest government hiring and f.iring
There would be comfort in such a decision for
·. strictures. Putting yesterday's preferred categoemployers eager to he_a d off trouble over the
ries on the payroll- World Warn and Korean
· composition of their work forces. It would, howveterans, almost all of whom are white males 'ever, do nothing about the grievances of the
and not being able to force them into earl~ reBrian Webers. Nor would it dispose of the practi.· Hrement means it's hard to find places for
cal anomalies that go with trying to set up a per·
tcxla}''s favored categories, the minorities and
feat -and long-range- distribution of employwomen. ·
~ by way of imperfect- and changing- statis. Now tlie Supreme Court has a variation on the
tics.
theme to deal with: the case of a man who lost
Furthermore, should the Court be swayed by
out on a Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Compan:Y
the EEOC arguments, it is easy to see what would .
training program because of an affirmative action quota reserving SO per cent of the places in · happen next. It's a short step f.rom making·quotas
legitimate to making them compulsory. A govit for blacks.
.
.
ernment guideline, as everybody knows, has
Two lower courts have already ruled in ·favor:
about as mueh genuine option in it as a top serof Brian Weber, the white Kaiser employee
geant's call for volunteers at the front.
·
whose seniority would have put him in the prothe
wrongness
of
quotas
is
·as
glarMeanwhile,
gram except for his race. Between that and the
ing as ever. They discourage merit initiatives, ar· Bakke precedent; there is reason to expect that
t-ificiaHy categorize people, · usurp private
the high court would either do the same or leave
authority
and perpetrate contemporary unfair·
it to Congress to clarify the ambiguities in the
nesses
to
redress
historic wrongs.
Civil Rights law that might justify' a contradicThe Bakke decision was no white-supremacy
. tory decision this time around.
ediGt. It took sympathetic note of past race disIt 's a drama involving more actors than Mr.
crimination, leaving wide latitude for compensaWeber and the nine justices. however. The·EEOC
tory aGtion on a case-by-case basis. But it ri ghtly .
is very much in the picture. The EEOC has a
rejected the rigidity of the quota approach. We
record of encouraging companies such as Kaiser
hope its spirit influences the court in Mr.
to i.nstitute voluntary programs to increase the
Weber's case, and in whatever others come up
numbers of certain target categories of people
because public policy places legitimate individ·
on their employment rosters, whether or not
ual claims in competition. ·
there is any question of discrimination against
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.

. .... ............
... .... .
.. ... ...............

j)u.prtutt <lfonrt ltf tlyt ~lt .§tz
~ufrittgtcn. ~. <!J. 20gi)l>2
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 30, 1979

(78-432 - United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
(78-435 - Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Weber
(78-436 - United States v. Weber
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Until I can report to Lewis and ascertain his
position, which I will canvass today, I will remain
in my "Pass" position. Deference to a colleague
unavoidably absent from participation in a case so
inherently and institutionally important commands no
less in my judgment. Obviously Lewis' view cannot
be controlling either on the merits or on reargument
in light of the vote, but he is due no less so far
as I am concerned.
This will enable me to cast a firm vote promptly.

Reg~~

tlrt

..§u.prnttt Clfouri af
~b ~
~ufrin!l'hm ~. QJ. 20,?'!~
CHAMB!:RS

o..-

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 1, 1979 .

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Re:

78-354)United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
)

78-435)Kaiser Aluminum & Chern Corp v. Weber
)

78-436)U.S. v. Weber

I have reported to Lewis on the Conference, and
I now vote to affirm in the above case.
I would, as I stated at Conference, much prefer
to have employers free to initiate their own private programs
to give minorities preferential treatment. However, I
can find no principled basis to avoid the explicit language
of the relevant statutory provisions which foreclose such
programs based on race.
Accordingly, I have requested Bill Brennan to
take responsibility for the assignment.
Regards,

j)uprmtt <!Jllltti ttf llft ~lt ;§fattg

Jfag!rittghm, ~. <!J. 2Ll~){.j

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 7, 1979

Re:

78-432, United Steelworkers v. Weber

Dear Bi 11 ,
If there are three others who join your proposed
opinion, I shall also join in order to make it an
opinion of the Court. Considering the diversity of our
views, I think you have done an admirable job. It may
be that I shall have a few very minor suggestions.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

j)u:putttt Qf!lu.rt llf tqt ~b j)tlrltn
'lliJanlfingtGn, ~.

cq.

20p'!~

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 7, 1979

Re:

78-432 - United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, etc.

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
/. m.
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

~u:prtmt

<!Jcttrl!tf f1tt 'Jlnitt~ ~~g
jiret.S'fri:nghm. ~. <!f. 2llg!Jt~

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 7, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-432, 78-435 & 78-436 - United Stee1workers
v. Weber

Dear Bill:
In due course I will circulate a dissent from your
opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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C HAMB E RS OF

May 8, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/
Re:

No. 78-432, 435, and 436 - Steel Workers
v. Weber, etc

Dear Bill:
My posture is essentially the same as Byron's.
It is likely that I shall join your draft, but I, too,
prefer to see what is written on the other side.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

,•.

11'.

May 8 , 1979

78-432 United Steelworkers v . Weber

Dear Bill:
I

Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case .
Sincer~ly,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The

Conf~rence

.
'·

.Suprmu afonrl ~ tJre ~dt ,jmteg
JJaglp:n.gton. ~. <q:. 2ll,?J.l..;l
CHAMI!IERS OF

Re:

/

May 8, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

78-432, 78-435 & 78-436 - United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
etc.

Dear Bill,
It is likely that I shall sign up
on your present draft, but I shall wait
to see what is written on the other
side before deciding whether I have
suggestions of substance to submit.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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:SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
. NOS.

78-432, 78-435, AND 78-436·

United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO- CLC, Petitionet9
•7 -432
v.
Brian F. Weber et al.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation, Petitioner,
·78-435
v.
Brian F. Weber et aL

-

1~w,r~~
On Writs of Certiorari ~1'1<6~.14f
-the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

t

United States et al., Petitioners,
v.
78-436
Brian F. Weber et ai
[May -

9

1979]

MR.. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Challenged here is the legality of an affirmative action
plan-collectively bargained by an employer and a union~
that reserves for black employees 50% of the openings in an
in-plant craft training program until the percentage of black
craft workers in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks m the local labor force. The question for
decision is whether Congress, in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, left employers
and unions in the private sector free to take such raceconscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories. We hold that Title
VII does not prohibit such race-conscious affirmative action
plans.

•,'

•,
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I
In 1974 petitioner United Steelworkers of America (USWA)
and petitioner Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation
(Kaiser) entered into a master collective-bargaming agreement covering terms and conditions of employment at 15
Kaiser plants. The agreement contained, inter alia, an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicious racial
imbalances in Kaiser's then almost exclusively white craft
work forces. Black craft hiring goals were set for each Kaiser
plant equal to the percentage of blacks in the respective local
labor forces. To enable plants to meet these goals, on-thejob training programs were established to teach unskilled production workers----black and white--the skills necessary to
become craft workers. The plan reserved for black employees
50% of the openings in these newly created in-plant training
programs.
This case arose from the operation of the plan at Kaiser's
plant in Gramercy, La. Until 1974 Kaiser hired as craft
workers for that plant only persons who had had prior craft
experience. Because blacks had long been excluded from
eraft unions/ few were able to present such credentials. As
1

Judicuu findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so
numerous as to make such exclu~ion a proper subject for judiCial notice.
Sec, e. g., Umted States v. Intematwnal Union of Elevator Constructors,
538 F. 2d 1012 (CA3 1976); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts v. Alshuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (CA11973); Unzted States v. Wood, Wire
and Metal Lathers, 471 F. 2d 40S (CA2 1973); Southern Illinois Bu1/ders
Association v. Ogilve, 471 F. 2cl 680 (CA7 1972); Contractors Association
of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159 (CA3
1971), Local 53 of International Association of Heat & Frost, etc . v.
Vogler, 407 F . 2d 1047 (CA5 1969), Buckner v. Goodyear, 339 F. Supp.
1108 (ND Ala. 1972), aff'd without opmion, 476 F. 2d 1287 (CA5 1973)
See al·o United States CommJ:s:;wn on Civil Rights, The Challrnge Ahead
(1976), pr> 58-94 (summarizing ,111dlcial findings of discrimmatwn by

I
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~ consequence, prior to 1974 only 1.83% (five out of 273) of
the skilled craft workers at the Gramercy plant were black,
even though the work force in the Gramercy area was approximately 39ro black.
Pursuant to the national agreement Kaiser altered its craft
hiring practice in the Gramercy plant. Rather than hiring
already· trained outsiders, Kaiser established a training program to train its production workers to fill craft openings.
Selection of craft trainees was made on the basis of seniority,
with the proviso that at least 50% of the new trainees were
to be black until the percentage of black skilled craft workers
in the Gramercy plant approximated the percentage of blacks
in the local labor force. See 415 F. Supp. 761, 764.
During 1974, the first year of the operation of the KaiserUSWA affirmative action plan, 13 craft trainees were selected
from Gramercy's production work force. Of these, 7 were
black and 6 white. The most junior black selected into the
program had less seniority than sever~l white production
workers whose bids for admission were rejected. Thereafter
one of those white production workers, respondent Brian
Weber, instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
The complaint alleged that the filling of craft trainee positions at the Gramercy plant pursuant to the affirmative action
program had resulted in junior black employees receiving
training in preference to more senior white employees, thus
discriminating against respondent and other similarly situated

craft unions) , Myrdal, An American D1lemma (1962) 1079-1124; Marshall and Bnggs, Thr Negro and Apprenticeship (1967); Spero and Harris,
The Black Worker (1968); Umtrd States Commisswn on C1vil Rights,
Employment (1961), p. 97; State AdVLo;ory Committee, United States
ComJm:>;;ion on Civil R1ghts, 50 Stat~s Report (1961), p. 209; Marshall,
''The Negro in Southern Unions," in The Negro and the American Labor
Movement (ed. Jaeob80n, Anchor 1968) p 145 : Appendix, at 63, 104.

"l...

'78-432, 78-435 & 78-436-0PINION
4

STEELWORKERS v. WEBER

white employees m violation of §§ 703 (a) 2 and (d) 3 of
Title VII. The District Court held that the plan violated
Title VII, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff class,
and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Kaiser and
the USWA "from denying plaintiffs, Brian F. Weber and all
other members of the class, access to on-the-job tra.ining programs on the basis of race." 415 F. Supp. 761 (1976). A
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that all employment preferences based upon
race, including those preferences incidental to bona fide affirmative action plans, violated Title VII's prohibition against
racial discrimination in employment. 563 F. 2d 216 (1978).
We granted certiorari. - - P . S. - - (1979). We reverse.
11

We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry.
Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action,
this case does not present an alleged violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. Further, since thr
Kaiser-USW A plan was adopted voluntarily, we are not con2 SectiOn 703 (a), 42 U. S. C.§ 2000e-2 (a), provides :
' (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer" (1) to fail or refuse to hire or t{) discharge any individual, or otherwise to dn;cri:m.inate agamst any individual with respect t{) his compensation, terms, cond1tiom;, or pnvileges of employment, because of such
mdiv1dual's race, color, rf'hgion, sex, or natwnal ongin; or
" (2) to hm1t or cla<1sify h1s employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would depnve or tend to deprive any inclividual of
employment. opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, becau,;e of such md1vidual':; race, color, religion, srx, or national
ongin ."
a Section 703 (d), 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2 (d), provides :
" It shall be an unlawful emJ1loyment practice for any employer, labor
orgamzatwn, or JOmt labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, mdudmg on-the-job training programs
to dJ::;crimmate again~( [U1Y mdiv1dual because of hi8 race, color, religicn,
~ex , or national ongm in admi><::-:Ion to, or employment in, any program
eHtabh~b(:'d to provide apprcnttcrs111p or other traimnp; '

,_ I
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cerned with what Title VII requires or with what a court
might order to remedy a past proven violation of the Act.
The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue of
whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from
voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans
that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser- USWA plan. That question was
expressly left open in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 281 n. 8 (1976) which held, in a case not involving affirmative action , that Title VII protects whites as well
as blacks from certam forms of racial discrimination.
Respondent argues that Congress intended in Title VII to
prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans. Respondent's argument rests upon a literal interpretation of §§ 703
(a) and (d) of the Act. Those sections make it unlawful to
"discriminate . .. because of ... race" in hiring and in the
selection of apprentices for training programs. Since, the
argument runs, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trans. Co., supra,
settled that Title VII forbids discrimiuation against whites as
well as blacks, and since the Kaiser-USWA affirmative action
plan operates to discriminate against white employees solely
because they are white, it follows that the Kaiser-USW A plan
violates Title VII.
Respondent's argumeu t is not without force. But it overlooks the significance of the fact that the Kaiser-USW A plan
is an affirmative a.ction plan voluntarily adopted by private
parties to eliminate traditional patterns .Qf racial segregation.
In this c0i1fext respol1cl'eiit'herlance upon a literal construction of § 703 (a) and (d) and upon McDonald is misplaced.
SeeMcDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans . Co., supra, at 281 n. 8.
lt is a "familiar rule. that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute a.nd yet not within the statute, because not within
1ts spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. '' Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892).
The prohibition against racial discrimination 'in§§ 703 (a) and

7
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(d) of Title VII must therefore be read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical
context from which the Act a.rose. See Train v. Colorado
Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976);
Woodworkers v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 620 (1967); United
States v. American "I'rucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544
(1940) . Examination of those sources makes clear that an
interpretation of the sections that forbade all race-conscious
affirmative action would "bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute" and must be rejected. United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U. S.
295, 315 (1953). See Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S.
427, 432 ( 1952); International Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,
342 U. S. 237, 243 (1952); Feres v. United States, 340 U. S.
135 (1950); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204
U. S. 426 (1907) .
Congress' primary concern in ena.cting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was with "the plight of the Negro in our economy." 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to "unskilled and
semi-skilled jobs." !d., at 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
id., at 7204 (remarks of Sen. Clark); 2 Schwartz, Statutory
History of the United States: Civil Rights at 1296 (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy). Because of automation the number of
such jobs was rapidly decreasing. See 110 Cong. Rec., at 6548
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 7204 (remarks of Sen.
Clark). As a consequence "the relative position of the Negro
worker [was] steadily worsening. In 1947 the non-white
unemployment rate was only 64 percent higher than the white
rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher.'' I d., at 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See also id., at 7204 (remarks of
Sen. Clark). Congress considered this a serious social problem. As Senator Clark told the Senate :
" The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up con-
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sistently as compared with white unemployment for the
past 15 years. This is a social malaise and a social situation which we should not tolerate. That is one of the
principal reasons why this bill should pass." 110 Cong.
Rec. 7220.
Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Actthe integration of blacks into the mainstream of American
society-could not be achieved unless this trend were reversed.
And Congress recognized that that would not be possible
unless blacks were able to secure jobs "which have a future."
!d., at 7204 (remarks of Sen. ·clark). See also Schwartz,
supra, at 1296 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). As Senator
Humphrey explained to the Senate :
"What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a
fine restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What
good does it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too
expensive for his modest income? How can a Negro child
be motivated to take full advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where
he can use that education?" 110 Cong. Rec., at 6547.
"Without a. job, one cannot afford public convenience
and accommodations. Income from employment may be
necessary to further a man's education, or that of his
children. If his children have no hope of getting a good
job, what will motivate them to take advantage of educational opportunities." Schwartz, supra, at 1234.
These remarks echoed President Kennedy's original message
to Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act
m 1963.
"There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right
to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash
in his pocket and no job." !d., at 1059.

..•

'.
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Accordingly, it was clear to Congress that "the crux of the
problem [ was·l to open employment opportunities for Negroes
in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them/'
id., at 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), and it was to this
problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimi~
nation in employment was primarily addressed.
It plainly appears from the House Report accompanying
the Civil Rights Act that Congress did not intend wholly to
prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as
one method of solving this problem. The Report provides:
"No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of
the causes and consequences of racial and other types of
discrimination against minorities. ·There is reason to
believe, however, that national leadership provided by the
enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most
troublesome problems will create an atmosphere condu~
cive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of
discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. ( 1963), at 18. (Emp1lasis supplied.)
Given this legislative history, we cannot agree with re~
spondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sector
from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve. ·The very statutory words
intended as a spur or catalyst to cause "employers and unions
to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this
country's history," Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418
(1975), cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition
against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
efforts to hasten the elimination of such vestiges:' It would
• The problem that Congresil addressed in 1964 remains with us. In
1962 the nonwhite unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white
rate. See Schwa,rtz, supra, at 1224 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). In
1978 the black unemployment rate waH 129% higher . See Monthly

j
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be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot
of those who had "been excluded from the American dream
for so long." Schwartz, supra, at 1234 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey), constituted the first legislative prohibition of all
voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.
Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the
language and legislative history of § 703 (j) of Title VIV
Opponents of Title VII raised two related arguments against
the bill. First, they argued that the Act would be interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work
forces to grant preferental treatment to racial minorities in
order to integrate. Second, they argued that employers with
racially imbalanced work forces would grant preferential trea.tment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the
Act. See 110 Cong. Rec. 8618-8619 (remarks of Sen. SparkLabor Review, U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 78
(Mar. 1979).
5 Section 703 (j) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j), provides:
"Nothing conta.ined in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed
by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprenticeship or othrr training program, in comparison with the total
number or percentage or persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or
nat.ional origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available work force in MY community, State, section, or other area."
Section 703 (j) speaks to substantivr liability under Title VII, but it
dors not. preclude courts from considering racial imbalance as evidence of
a Title VII violation. See Teamsters v. United States. 431 U. S. 324, 339340, n. 20 (1977). Remedie:; for substantive violations are governed by
§ 706 (g)' 42
§ 2000e-5 (g) .

u. s. c.

''
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man) . Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious
affirmative a.ction, as respondent urges, it easily could have
answered both objections by providing that Title VII would
not require or permit racially preferential integration efforts.
But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather Congress
added § 703 ( ·) which addresses only the first objection. The
sec wn provides t a no mg con ame m Title VII "shall be
interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential
treatment ... to any group because of the race . .. of such ...
group on account of" a defacto racial imbalance in the employer's work force. The section does not state that "nothing
in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit" voluntary a.ffirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances. The natural inference is that Congr~ chose not to forbid all voluntary raceconscious affirmative action.
The reasons for this choice are evident from the legislative
record. Title VII could not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who
traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business.
Those legislators demanded as a price for their support that
"management prerogatives and union freedoms ... be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." H. R. Rep.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 64, 150 (1963) . Section 703
(j) was pro1~osed by Senator Dirksen to allay any fears that
the Act migft be interpreted in such a way as to upset this
compromise. I The section was designed to prevent § 703 of
Title VII fr9m being interpreted in such a way as to lead to
undue "Federal Government interference with private businesses because of some Federal employee's ideas about racial
balance or imbala.nce." Id., at 14314 (remarks of Sen. Miller).6 See also 110 Cong. Rec. 9881 (remarks of Sen. Allott) ;
6 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered in University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), contains no provision
comparable to § 703 (j). This is because Title VI was an exercise of
federal power over a matter in which the Federal Government was already

I
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id., at 10520 (remarks of Sen. Carlson); id., at 11471 (remarks
of Sen. Javits); id., at 12817 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
Clearly, a prohibition against all voluntary, race-conscious,
affirmative action efforts would disserve these ends. Such a
prohibition would augment the powers of the Federal Government and diminish traditional management prerogatives while
at the same time impeding attainment of the ultimate statutory goals. In view of this legislative history and in view of
Congress' desire to avoid undue federal regulation of private
businesses, use of the word "require" rather than the phrase
"require or permit" in § 703 (j) fortifies the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom
to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action.7
directly involved: the prohibitions against. raer-based conduct contained in
Title VI governed "program[s] or activit[ies] receiving Federal financial
assistance.'~ 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Congrcs~ was legislating to aEsure
federal funds would not be used in an improper manner. Title VII, by
contrast, was enacted pursuant to the Commerce power to regulate purely
private decisionmaking and was not intended to incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Title
VII and Titlr. VI, therefore, cannot. be read in pari materia. Sre 110
Cong. Rec. 8:~14 (1964) (remark~ of Sen. Cooper) . See also id., at. 11615
(remarks of $rn. Cooper).
7 Responde11t argues that our construction of § 703 conflicts with vari<Jus remarks io the legislative record. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (Sens.
Clark and CnKr); id., at 7218 (Sens. Clark and Case); id., at 6549
(Sen. Humphrry); id., at 8921 (Sm. Williams). We do not agree. In
Senator Humphrey's words, thrse comments were intended as as~urances
that Title VII would not allow establishmrnt of systems "to rnaintain
racial balance in employment.'' id., at 11848. They we11e not. addre~sed
to temporary, voluntary, affirmative action measure~ undertaken to rliminate manifest racial imbalance in traditionally ~egregated job categories.
Moreover, the comments referred to by re~pondent all preceded the
adoption of § 703 (j), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). After § 703 (j) was
adopted eongrr>"sional comments wrre all to the effect that pmployrrs
would not be required to institute preferential quotas to avoid Title VII
liability, see, e. g., id., at 12817 (remarks of Sen. Dirksrn); id., at 13079-
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We therefore hold that Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703 (a)
and (d) against racial discrimination does not condemn all
private, voluntary, race-couscious affirmative action plans.

III
We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans. It suffices to hold that the challenged Kaiser-USW A
affirmative action plan falls on the permissible side of the
line. The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute.
Both were designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to "open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have
been traditionally closed to them." 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (rema.rks of Sen. Humphrey). 8
At the same time the plan does not unnecessarily trammel
the interests of the white employees.' The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement
with new black hires. Cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans.
13080 (remarks of Sen. Clark); id., at 15876 (remarks of Rep. Lmdsay).
There was no suggestion after the adoption of § 703 (j) tha.t wholly voluntary, ra,ce-conscious, affirmativE' action efforts would in them::;?lves constitute a violation of Title VII. OT1 the contrary, as Repre.;;entativc
MacGregor told the House shortly before the final vote on Tit!P VII:
"Important as the scope and extent of this bill is, it is also vitally
important that all Americans understand wha.t this bill does not cover.
"Your mail and mine, your cont.a.ct:,; and mine with our constihwnts,
indicates a great degrPe of misundero:tanding about. this bill. People complain about ... preferential treatment or quota<> in employment. There
is a mistaken belief that Congress is legislating in these a.reas in this bill.
When we drafted this bill we excluded the:se issues largely becausp the
problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level clo~er to the American people and by communities and individuals thPmselves." 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (remarks of
Rep. MacGregor) .
8 See n. 1, supra.
This is not to ::;uggest that the freedom of an employer to undertake race-conscious affirmative action efforts dPpends on
whether or not his effort is motivated by fPilr of liabilit~r under Title VIL

l
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Co., supra. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees; half of those trained in
the program will be white. Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance,
but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of cra.ft trainees at the Gramercy plant will
end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craft workers in
the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in
the local labor force. See 415 F. Supp. 761, 763.
We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the KaiserUSW A plan for the Gramercy plant falls within the area of
discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily
to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicious racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.0 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal~
for the Fifth Circuit is
Reversed.

MR. JusTICE PowELL and MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case.

9 Our disposition makes unnecessary consideration of petitioners' argument that their plan was ju&iified because they feared tha.t black employees would bring suit under Title VII if they did not adopt an affirmative
action plan. Nor need we consider petitioners' contention that their
affirmative action plan represented an attempt to comply with Executive
Order 11246.
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minority workers; the affidavits simply recite isolated and unusual
stories of purported discrimination, and none show discrimination in
the seniority system justifying a racial quota.

If movants have valid

claims of discrimination, they can assert them before the EEOC or the
courts; the decision in this case will not affect their rights.
6/4/79
PJC

Richman

;§u.prtmt <!J~ af t4t ~!~ .§htftg

.. Mfri:ngfutt. ~·

Qf.

2l1g!J-1..;1

J

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 5, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-432, 78-435, and 78-436 - United Steelworkers v. Weber

Dear Bill:
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of 1964, spans twelve bound volumes of the Congressional
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intention of circulating a dissent at least on the issue
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MR. JusTICE

dissenting.
In a very real sense, the Court's opinion is ahead of its
time: it could more appropriately have been handed down five
years from now, in 1984, a year coinciding with the title of
a book from which the Court's opinion borrows, perhaps subconsciously, at least one idea. Orwell describes in his book
a govern men tal official of Oceania, one of the three great
world powers, denouncing the current enemy, Eurasia, to an
assembled crowd:
"It was almost impossible to listen to him without being
first convinced and then maddened. . . . The speech had
been proceeding for perhaps twenty minutes when amessenger hurried onto the platform and a scrap of paper was
slipped into the speaker's hand. He unrolled and read it
without pausing in his speech. Nothing altered in his
voice or manner, or in the content of what he was saying,
REHNQUIST,
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but suddenly the names were different. Without words
said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd.
Oceania was at war with Eastasia! . . . The banners and
posters with which the square was decorated were all
wrong! ...
"[T]he speaker had switched from one line to the other
actually in mid-sentence, not only without a pause, but
without even breaking the syntax." G. Orwell, Nineteen
Eighty-Four, 182-183 (1949).
Today's decision represents a.n equally dramatic and equally
unremarked switch in this Court's interpretation of Title VII.
The operative sections of Title VII prohibit racial discrimination in employment simpliciter. Taken in its normal
meaning, and as understood by all Members of Congress who
spoke to the issue during the legislative debates. see infra, at
- , this language prohibits a covered employee from considering race when making an employment decision, whether
the race be black or white. Several years ago, however, a
United States District Court held that "the dismissal of white
employees charged with misappropriating company property
while not dismissing a similarly charged Negro employee does
not raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be granted."
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 'Pranps. Co., 427 U. S. 273, 278
( 1976). This Court unanimously reversed, concluding from
the "uncontradicted legislative history" that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in
this case upon the same standards as would be applicable
were they Negroes .... " 427 U. S., at 280.
We have never waivered in our understanding that Title
VII "prohibits all racial discrimination in employment, without exception for any particular employees." !d., at 283 (emphasis in original). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S.
424, 429 (1971), our first occasion to interpret Title VII, a
unanimous court observed that "[d]iscriminatory preference,
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
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Congress has proscribed." And in our most recent discussion
of the issue, we uttered words seemingly dispositive of this
case: "It .is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by
Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of
the applicant's race are already proportionately represented
in the work force." Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U. S. 567, (1978) (emphasis in original). 1
Today, however, the Court behaves much like the Orwellian
speaker earlier described, as if it had been handed a note indicating that Title VII would lead to a result unacceptable to
the Court if interpreted here as it was in our prior decisions.
Accordingly, without even a break in syntax, the Court rejects
"a literal construction of § 703 (a)" in favor of newly discovered "legislative history," which leads it to a conclusion
directly contrary to that compelled by the "uncontradicted
legislative history" unearthed in McDonald and our other
prior decisions. Now we are told that the legislative history
of Title VII shows that employers are free to discriminate on
the basis of race: an employer may, in the Court's words,
"trammel the interests of white employees" in favor of black
employees in order to eliminate "racial imbalance." Ante, at
12. Our earlier interpretations of Title VII, like the banners
and posters decorating the square in Oceania, were all wrong.
As if this were not enough to make a reasonable observer
question this Court's adherence to the oft-stated principle that
our duty is to construe rather than rewrite legislation, United
States v. Rutherford, slip op., at 9 (June -, 1979), the
Court also seizes upon ~ 703 (j) of Title VII as an independent, or at least partially independent, basis for its holding.
Totally ignoring the wording of that section, which is obviously addressed to those charged with the responsibility of
Our ~1atcmcn1s in Gn'ggs and Furnco Construction, paten1ly inronsil:;tcn1 with today'~ holding, nrc not even mentioned, much les · di~tinguishcd,
by 1he Comt.
1
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interpreting the law rather than those who are subject to its
proscriptions, and totally ignoring the months of legislative
debates preceding the section's introduction and passage,
which demonstrate clearly that it was enacted to prevent
precisely what occurred in this case, the Court infers from
§ 703 (j) that "Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary
race-conscious affirmative action." Ante, at 10.
Thus, by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such
as Hale, Holmes, or Hughes, but of escape artists such as
Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language, "uncont~adicted" legislative history, and uniform precedent in concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider
race in making employment decisions. It may be that one or
more of the principal sponsors of Title VII would have preferred to see a provision allowing preferential treatment of
minorities written into the bill. Such a provision , however, would have to have been expressly or impliedly excepted
from Title VII's explicit prohibition on all racial discrimination in employment. There is no such exception in the Act.
And a reading of the legislative debates concerning Title
VII, in which proponents and opponents alike uniformly denounced discrimination in favor of, as well as discrimination
against, Negroes, demonstrates clearly that any legislator harboring an unspoken desire for such a provision could not
possibly have succeeded in enacting it into law.

I
Kaiser opened its Gramercy, La., plant in 1958. Because
the Gramercy facility had no apprenticeship or in-plant craft
training program, Kaiser hired as craft workers only persons
with prior craft experience. Despite Kaiser's efforts to locate
and hire trained black craftsmen. few were available in the
Gramercy area, and as a consequence, Kaiser's craft positions
were manned almost exclusively by whites. In February
1974, under pressure from the Office of Fede.ral Contract Com-
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pliance to increase minority representation in craft positions
at its various plants/ and hoping to deter the filing of employment discrimination claims by minorities, Kaiser entered
into a collective-bargaining agreement with the United Steelworkers of America (Steelworkers) which created a new onthe-job craft training program at 15 Kaiser facilities, including the Gramercy plant. The agreement required that no
less than one minority applicant be admitted to the training
program for every nonminority applicant until the percentage
of blacks in craft positions equaled the percentage of blacks
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), subsequently
renamed the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP),
is an arm of the Department of Labor responsible for ensuring compliance
by government contractors with the equal employment opportunity responsibilities established by Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319
(1965), as amended by Executive Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303
(1967), and by Executive Order 12086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46501 (1978).
Executive Order 11246 requires all applicants for federal contracts to
refrai,n from employment discrimination and to "take affirmative action
to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated
during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or
national origin." § 202 (j), 3 CFR § 169 (1974), reprinted following 42
U. S. C. § 2000e (1970) . The Executive Order empowers the Secretary
of Labor to issue rules and regulations necessary and appropriate to
achieve its purpose. He, in turn, has delegated most enforcement duties
to the OFCC. See 41 CFR § 60-20.1 et seq.; 41 CFR § 60-2.24.
The affirmative action program mandated by 41 CFR § 60-2 (Revised
Order No. 4) for nonconstruction contractors requires a "utilization" study
to determine minority representation in the work force. Goals for hiring
and promotion must be set to overcome any "underutilization" found to
exist.
The OFCC employs the "power of the purse" to coerce acceptance of
its affirmative action plans. Indeed, in this case, "the district court found
that the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement reflected less of a desire on
Kaiser's part to train black craft workers than a self-interest in satisfying
the OFCC in order to retain lucrative government contracts." 563 F. 2d
216, 226 (CA5 1977).
2
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in the local work force. 3 Eligibility for the craft training programs was to be determined on the basis of plant seniority,
with black and white applicants to be selected on the basis
of their relative seniority within their racial group.
Brian Weber is white. He was hired at Kaiser's Gramercy
plant in 1969. In April 1974 Kaiser announced that it was
offering a total of nine positions in three on-the-job training
3

The pertinent portions of the collective-bargaining agreement provide:

~pecifically review the
minority rrJlfeHrntation in the exiHting Trade, Craft and A~signed Maintenance classifications. in the plant>< set forth below, and, where neces,;ary,
establish certain goah; and timr table~ in order to achieve a desired
minority ratio :

''It i:; further agreed that the Joint Committee will

"[Gramercy Works listed, among other:sl
"As apprentice and craft jobs are to be filled, the contractual ::;election
criteria ~ hall be applied in rraching such goal;;; at a minimum , not less
than o1w minority employE'e will C'nter for E'very non-minority employE'e
entering until thE' goal is rC'arhed unless at a particular time there are
insuf:ficient available qua.lified minority candidates....
"The tNm 'minority' as UEt'd herC'in shall be as defined in EEOC Reporti11g HE>quirenwnt~." 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (ED La. 1976) .
ThC' '·Joint Commiitee" ~ubH2qll(mtly entere<.l into a ":\Iemorandum of
Unc.ler:;tanding" e:stabli~hing a goal of 39% as the percentage of blacks that
must be rE'pre"E'nted in each "cra ft family" at Kaiser's Gramercy plant.
!d., at 764. The goal of 39% minority representation was based on the
percentage of minority workers available in thE' Gramercy area.
Contrar~· to the Court's a:;::;rrtion, it is not at all clear that, Kai::;er'::;
admiHsion quota i:s n "temporary mC'asurP" ... not intended to maintain
racial imbalance." Ante. at 13. DenniR E. English, indu::;trial relationl:i
superintendent at thr Gramerc~· plant, tel:itified at trial:
"Oncr the goal il:i rE'ached of 39 percent, or whatever the figure will bE'
down the road, I think it's subject to change, once the goal is rE'ached in
each of the craft familir~, at that time, we w1ll then revert to a ratio of
what that percentage i~, if it remainl:i at 39 percent and we attain 39
percent someday, we will thC'u continue placing trainees in the program at
that percpntage. The idea , ngain, being to have n mmority repre::;cntation
in the plant that is equal to that representation in the community work
force· population." App . 69 ..
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programs for skilled craft jobs. Weber applied for all three
programs, but was not selected. The successful candidatesfive black and four white applicants-were chosen in accord·
ance with the 50% minority admission quota mandated under
the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement. Two of the successful black applicants had less seniority than Weber. 4
Weber brought the instant class action 5 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging
that use of the 50% minority admission quota to fill vacancies
in Kaiser's craft training programs violated Title VII's prohibition on racial discrimination in employment. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed, enjoining further use of race as a criteria in admitting
applicants to the craft training programs. 0
• In addition to the April programs, the company offered three more
training programs in 1974 with a total of four positions available. Two
white and two black employees were selected for the programs, which were
for "Air Conditioning Repairman" (one position), "Carpenter-Painter"
(two positions), and "Insulator" (one position). Weber sought to bid for
the insulator trainee position, but he was not selected because that job
was rc~erved for the most senior qualified black employee. App. 46.
5 The class was defined to include the following employees:
"All persons employed by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation at
its Gramercy, Louisiana, works who are members of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO Local 5702, who are not member~ of a
minority group, and who have applied for or were eligible to apply for
on-the-job tra.ining programs since February 1, 1974." 415 F. Supp., at
763.
0 In upholding the District Court's injunction, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's finding that Kaiser had not been guilty of
any past discriminatory hiring or promotion at its Gramercy plant. The
court thus concluded that this finding removed the instant case from this
Court's line of "remedy" decisions authorizing fictional seniority in order
to place proven victims of discrimination in as good a position as they
would have enjoyed ab~ent the discriminatory hiriPg practices. See
Franks v. Bowman 1'ransp. Co., 424 U . S. 747 (1976). "In the absence
of prior discrimination," the Court of Appeals observed, "a racial quota
loses it;; character as an equitablP 1'emedy m1d must lw banned a~ :m
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II

Were Congress to act today specifically to prohibit the type
of racial discrimination suffered by Weber, it would be hard
pressed to draft language better tailored to the task than that
fountl in ~ 703 (d) of Title VII:
"lt shall be an unlawful employment practice for any
employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or emtmlawful racial preference prohibited by Title VII, §§ 703 (a) and (d).
TitlE' VII outlaw,; prefereBCf'S for any group, minority or majority, if based
on race or othf'r impPrmi~sible cla~Rifications, but it does not outlaw
prefPrencet" favoring victims of di~crimi11ation." 563 F. 2d, at 224 (rmphasis in original). Nor was the Court of Appeals moved by the claim
that Kaiser'~ di~criminator~· admis~ion quota is justified to correct a lack
of training of Negroe"' due to past societal discrimination: "Whatever other
pffects societal di~;crimination may have, it has had-by the specific finding
of the court below , no effect on the seniority of any party here." !d., at
226 (Pmphasis in original) . Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the
argmnPnt. that. Kaisrr's admission quota dof'i:i not violate TitlE' VII because.
it i:; :;anctionrd, indPrd eompellrd, by Exrcutive Order 11246 and regulat ions ii'Suf'd by the OFCC mandating affirmative action by all govrrnment
contractor:;;. See n. 2, supra. Citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sau•yer·, 34:3 U. S. 579 (1952), thf' court concluded that " l1]f ExPcutive
Order 11246 mandates a racial quota for admission to on-the-job 1raining
by Kai~er, in the absence of any prior hir·ing or promotion discrimination,
the Executivr Order must fall before the direct congressional prohibition
[of §703 (d)J ." ld. , at 227 (empha~is in original) .
Judge Wisdom, in di~sent, argued that '' [i]f an affirmative action plan,
adopted in a collective bargaining agrpemcnt, i ~ a reasonable rPmedy for
an arguable violation of Title VII, it. ~hould bf' uphPld ." ld., at 230. The
Unit('d StatE's, in its brief bPforf' this Court, largely adopts JudgE' Wil:ldorn's thcor~·, which apparently rf'sb on the ronclusion that an employer
is freE' to eorrect arguable discriminatiou again:st his black employees by
adopting measurr;; that he knows will discriminate again:st his white
emplo ·ees.
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ployment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training." 43 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (d).
Equally suited to the task would be~ 703 (a) (2), which makes
it uulawful for an employer to classify his employees "in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion. sex, or national origin." 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-2 (a) (2). 7
Entirely consistent with these two express prohibitions is
the language of § 703 (j) of Title VII, which provides that the
Act .is not to be interpreted "to require any employer ... to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race ... of such individual or group" to correct
a racial imbalance in the employer's work force. 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (j). 8
Seizing on the word "require," the Court
Section 703 (a) (1) provides the third express prohibition in Title VII
of Kaist>r':; di:>criminatory admiHSion quota:
" It ~hall be an unlawful emplo~'ment practice for an employer"(1) to fail or refusP to hirP or to diHchargf' an individual, or othf'rwise
to di:scriminate against any individual with respect to hi,; compensation,
tPrm~, conditions, or privilf'geH of employment, bf'cause of such individual's
race, color, religion, sf'x, or national origin . . . . " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e2 (a) (1) .
8 The full text of § 703 (j), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j), provides as
follows:
"(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment ag<'nry, labor organiza1 ion, or joint labormanagrment commit teP :subjrct to this subchapter to grant preferential
trf'atmrnt to any individual or to nny group becnuse of the race, color,
religion, ~('X, or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalancr which may exi:>t with respect to the total number or perrentage of per::;ons of any rnce, color, religion, sex, or national origin employrd by any employf'r, rPfened or classified for employment by any
rmployment agency or labor organization, ad mitt f'd to membership or
cla::;sifird by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprentice::;hip or other training program, in compari::;on with the total
numhrr or percentage of llersom; of such race, color, rrligjon, sex, or na1
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"infers tl1at Congress must have intended to "permit" this type
of racial discrimination. Not o1lly is this reading of § 703 ( j)
outlandish in the light of the fiat prohibitions of ~~ 703 (a)
and (d), but. as explain rei Part III, it is totally belied by the
Act's legislative history.
Quitc simply, Kaiser's racially discriminatory admission
quota is flatly prohibited by the plain language of T'itle VII.
This normally d1sposi£ive fact." however. gives the Court only
monwntary pause. An "interpretation" of the statute upholding Wt:>ber's claim would, according to the Court, "'bring
about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the
statute.'" Ante, at 6. quoting United States v. Public Util.,.
ities Comm 'n, 345 U. S. 295. 315 (1953). To support this
conclusion. the Court cans upon the "spirit" of the Act. which
1t eli vines fro m~:::s:i-::n_,'rl'l'f!'Itr;l-:c' VrTTnfi•'=s.,l
' 7eg=I:·sTI
: a::-;t~1:v:-::c-=-...,h~I=
sto ry in elieating that enactnwnt of the statute was prompted by Congress' clt:>sire "to opcn employmmt opportunities for Negroes
in occupations which [had] been traditionally closed to them."
Ante, at 8, quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of
Se11 . Humphrey). 10 But the legislative history invoked by
tiona! ori~ein in any rommnnit~·. Stnie, RrC'tion, or other arra, or in the
availablr work forre in :ut~· rommnni1~·, Statr, section, or ethpr arrn."
9 " lf tlw words arr plnin, thr~· givr nwaning to thP :wt, :mel it. i:-< n<>it.her
the duty nor thr privilege of the courts to enter ~pcculati,·c fields in search
of a diffrrPllt mranin~ .
" .. . [Wlhen word~ are frE'e from doubt they must be takrn as the
final exprr~~<ion of the IE'gislntive intrnt, and nrc not io br acldc·d io or
subtractE'd from by conHiderntion;; drnwn ... from nn~· cxtrnneous source."
Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) .
1·0 In holding thnt Titlr VII eannot be intE'rprC'trcl to prohibit usc of
Kni;;rr',; racinlly di~criminator~· ndmis;;ion quota, thr Court rrnsons that it
would br "ironic" if a law in;;pired by thr hi;;tor~· of rncial di~criminntion
in rmplo~·mrnt ngainst bbch forbndr rmployf'I'H from voluntnrily discriminatillg against whitr~< in favor of black:-. I 10er no irony in a law
that prohibits all volun1nry raeial discrimination, E'V<'ll discrimination directPcl a1 whit(•;; in favor of blacks. Thr evil inhrr<•n1 in discrimination
ugaim;t N~>gro<'tl i::< that it ~" bm.;rd on nn ipnm,tnhle charnctrri;;tir, utt('rlf

l
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the Court to avoid the plain la11guage of §§ 703 (a) and (d)
simply misses the point. To be sure, the reality of employment discrimination against Nfgroes provided the primary
impetus for passage of Title VII. But this fact by no means
supports tho proposition that Congress intended to leave employers free to discriminate against white persons. 11 In most
irrPIPvant to rmploynwnt cl<'eision:oJ. ThP rharart<'ristie h<'rom<'s no lrss
immutabiP and irrPirvnnt, nnd discrimination basrd thereon brromes no
less rvil, simp!~· bN•ausr thr prrsm1 cxrluclcd is a membrr of one race
rathrr than anoth(•r. Far from ironic, I find a prohibition on all prefrrential trratmrn! ba:<('(l on racr as rlrmrn!ary and fundamental as the prinriplr that "two wrong~ do not makr a right."
11 The onl,\' shred of lrgi~Jativ<' hi>'tor~· ritt•d h~· th<' Court in ~upport of
t11(' proposition that "Congre~s did not intf'nd wholl~· to prohibit pri,·nte
nncl vohmtar~· affirmative action effort~," ante, at R, is 111(' following <'Xcerpt from the .Judiciary Committre Heport accompanying the civil rights
bill rrportrd to thr Hons<':
"No bill ran or should lay claim to eliminating all of tllC cnu e::; nnd
con~equencrs of racial and other typrs of di::;rrimination against minorii ie . ThNr is reason to b<•li<'vr. howev<'r, that national leacler:-;hip providrd hy the enaetmrnt of F<'deral legislation d!'tlling with thf' most
troublesomr problems will create an atmosphere l'onducive to voluntary 01'
local resolutiuu of other forms of discriminat:ion." H. R. Rrp. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Se~,.:., 18 (196a) (hen•inafter H. R. R<'p.), quot<'d a.nte, at
8.
Thr Comt srizrs ou th<' ilalicizrd lnngnagr t·o ::;npport its ronrlu~ion that
Congre~:'i did not intpncJ to prohibit volnntary impo~it ion of raciall~· discriminator~· rmployment quota~. The Court. howPvrr, ~top,.: too ~hort in
its rrading of tlw Hou~r Rrport . Thr words imm<'diatd~· following the
matf•rial rxr<'rptrd by thp Court are as follow:<:
"It is, howevN, poR~ihlr :md nPCrsRary for thr Congres~ to rnact lrgislation which prohibitR and providr~ t hr means of trrmina ting the most
serious types of discrimination. This H. R. 7152, a,.: amendrd. would
achieve in a numbf'r of rrlatrd nr<'as . It wonld rech1rf' disrriminntory
obstacleH to thr rxc>rci;;r of til<' right io votr and providr mPans of <'Xprditing the vindication of that right. It would mak<' it po:<~iblr to rrmove
thP daily affront and humiliation involvt>d in di>'rriminator~· drniaiH of
accf'~s to faei lit it'~ ost msibly oprn to t hP gP1wral pub !if·. It would gua rnntec thai thrrr will bt' no di><eriminnt ion npon rcripirnf>< of Fcdrral
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cases, tc r11 egislative history ... is more vague than the statute
we arc called upon to intcrpn't." United States v. Public
Utilities Comm''ll, 345 U.S. 295. 321 (1054) (Jackson. J.. concurring). Here. ho\vever. the lcgislativr history of Title VII
is as clear as the language' of~~ 703 (a) and (d). and it in'C'futably clrmonstratrs that C'ongrrss meant precisC'ly what it said
in ~~ 703 (a) and (d)-that no racial discrimination in employment is pennissiblr under Title vn. not rven preferential
treatment of minorities to correct racial imbalance.

III
In undrrtaking to rrvirw the kgislativc history of Title VII,
I am mindful that my topic hardly makes for light reading,
financial M.~iHtfllH'<' . It would prohibit di~rrimination in rmplo~·n1C'nt, and
proYidr mpan~ to rxprditP trrmination of di~rrimination in puhlir rduration. It would OJWn additional avrnu<·~ to dPnl with rrdrrss of drnials
of rqual protrction of tlw lawR on :wrount of rarr, color, rrligion, or llatioual origin hy State or lorn! authorities." H. R. Rep., at 18 (rmpha~is
addrcl).
Whrn thu~ rrad in ront<•xt. the m<•aning of thr italirizrd language in
thr Court 's rxcrrpt of tbr Hou~r RPport brromr~ rlrar. B~· draling with
"the mo~t ,;eriouH typeH of di~rrimination," ~ur h a~< di,;crimination in voting,
)Jublic arrommodation;;, rmploymPnt, PI r., H. R. 7152 would hopd'ully
inspi1•e "voluntary or Joe a! n·s<ilut.ion of otlwr form;.: of discrimination,"
thnt i ~. form ~ othrr than di~l·riminntion in yofing, publir nccommodntion.,
emplo~·nwnt , rir .
Onr rnn nl~o infrr from thr Houf'r Tit>port thnt 1hr .Tudiciar~' Committrc hopNl that fedPral legi:,;Jat ion would inspirr volunt nr~ · rlimination
of diRcriminat ion againRt minority group~ of hrr· t hnn t hosr protcrtt>d
unc!Pr thr hill, JWrhap~ thr ngl'd nnd handicnpprd to namr ju~t two. In
an~' evrnt , t hr Hou;.:r Hrport do<'~ not support tlw Comt '::; propoRition
that CongrP::>s, ·hy banning raeial discrimination in rmploymcnt, intt>nd('d
to prrmit racial diHcriminat ion in emplo~·mpn(.
Thu~, cxaminat ion of the Hou~r .Tudiriary Committrr '~ report rrvrals
that lhP Comt's intPrJH'Piatiorr of Titil' VII, far from being compt>lled
b~, th1• Aet'~ kgi~lativt' histor~·, i~ utter!~· without support in that lrgislntivc hit>tory. Indeed , as demonstrated in Part III, infm. thr Court',; intrrpretation of Title VII is totally refu!Pd b~· thr Art ',., IPgislativc ·hi~tory.
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but I am also fearful that nothing short of a thorough examination of the congressional debates will fully expose the magnitude of the Court's misinterpretation of Congress' intent.

A
Introduced on the floor of the House of Representatives on
June 20, 1963, the bill- H. R. 7152-that ultimately became
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained no compulsory provisions directed at private discrimination in employment. The
bill was promptly referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,
wherE> it was amended to include Title VII. With two exceptions, the bill reported by the House Judiciary Committee
contained~§ 703 (a) and (d) as they were ultimately enacted.
Amendments subsequently adopted on the House floor added
§ 703's prohibition against sex discrimination and § 703 (d)'s
coverage of "on the job training."
After noting that "[tjhe purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate ... discrimination in employment based on race, color,
religion. or national origin." the Judiciary Committee's report
simply paraphrased the provisions of Title VII without elaboration. H. R. Rep. No. 914. 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963)
(hereinafter H. R. Rep.). In a separate Minority Report, however, opponents of the measure on the Committee advanced a
line of attack which was reiterated throughout the debates in
both the House and Senate and which ultimately led to passage of ~ 703 (j). Noting that the word "discrimination" was
nowhere defined in H. R. 7152, the Minority Report charged
that the absence from Title VU of any reference to "racial imbalance" was a "public relations" ruse and that "the administration intends to rely upon its own construction of "discrimination ' as including the lack of racial balance .... " H. R. Rep.,
at 67-68. To demonstrate how the bill would operate in practice. the Minority Report posited a number of hypothetical
Pmployment situations, concluc.lillg in each example that the
employer "may be forced to hire according to race, to 'racially
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balance' those who work for him in every job classification or
be in violation of Federal law." !d., at 69 (emphasis in
original) .12
When H. R. 7152 reached the House floor, the opening
speech in support of its passage was delivered by Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and
the Congressman respolJSible for introducing the legislation.
A portion of that speech responded to criticism "seriously mis12

OJl(' example had partieulnr relevance to the instant caF<c:

"Under thr power granted in this bill, if n. carpenters' hiring hall, say, had
20 mrn awaiting call, tlw first 10 in seniority being white carpenters, the
union could br forcrd to pass t hrm ovrr in favor of carpenters beneath
them in seniority but of the stipulated race. And if thr union ro ·ter did
not contain the names of thr earpenters of thr race needed to 'racia!l~r
balance' the job, the union agent must, then, go to the street and recruit
member~ of the stipulated race in sufficirnt number to comply with Fedem] ordNs. el~e hi8 Local could be held in violation of Federal law." H. R.
Rep., at. 29.
From this and other examples, the Minority Report concluded: "That
this i~. in fact, a not too subtlr system of raeism-in-n'ver~e cannot be
sueces,;t'ully drnircl." ld .. at 73.
Obvious]~· responding to the ;\Iinority Report's charge thai federal
agencie~, particularly the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), would equate " discrimination" with "racial imbalance," 1he
Tiepuhliean spon,.:ors of tlw bill on the Judiciary Committer l:i1ated in a
separai (' i'Pporl:
"It must also be l:Stres~ed that the Commil:S::;ion must confine its activities
to correcting abu~e, not promoting <'quality with mathematical certainty.
1n thi~ regard, nothing in the till<' permits a person to demand employment. . . . Internal affairs of rmployrrl:i and labor organizations must
not bP interfern'd with exr<>pt to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practir<'~. It" primarr task is to make certain
that tlw ehannels of employmrnt arc• open to person,.; regardless of their
racr and 1hat jobs in compani<'s or membership in 1m ions are strictly
fill<'d on the ba~i,.; of qualification'' !d .. Part II, at 29.
The R<'publican supporter~ of i he bill concluded their remarks on Title
VII by declaring that "[a]ll wstigrs of inequality based solely on race
must be removed ...." I d., ai 30.
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representring] what the bill would do and grossly distort[ing]
its effects":
"[TJhe charge has been made that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to be established by title
VII of the bill would have the power to prevent a business from employing and promoting the people it wished,
aud that a 'Federal inspC'ctor' could then order the hiring
and promotion only of employees of certain races or religious groups. This description of the bill is entirely
wrong ....
"Even tfa] court could not order that any preference
Lc given to any particular race, religion or other group.
but would be limited to ordering an end of discrimination.
The statement that a Federal inspector could order the
employment and promotion only of members of a specific
racial or religious group is therefore patently erroneous.
" ... The Bill would do 110 more than prevent ... employC'rs from discrimi11ating against or -in favor of workers
because of their race. religion. or national origin.
"It is likevvise not true that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would have power to rectify existing 'racial or religious imbalancC'' in employment by
requiring the hiring of certain people without regard to
their qualifications simply because they are of a given
race or religion. Only actual discrimination could be
stopped." 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (emphasis added).
Representative C'eller's construction of Title VII was repeated
by srveral other supporters during the House dobate. 1 ::
1

~

Hrprrsrntaih·o Lind~H .\' had ihi~ io sa.v:

' ·Titi~

lcgishilion . . . dors nol , a~ has brcn Sllgg!'Ht!'d hrrrlofon· boih on
and off tlw Aoor, forcp nrrPpinnrr of prople in ... job;; ... hcrau~c they
nrc Nrg.ro. It does not impos(' qnolas or any ~Jlrl'iaiJ1l'ivi lcgrs of seniority
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Thus, the battle lines were drawn early in the legislative
struggle over Title VII, with opponents of the measure charging that agencies of the federal government such as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), by interpreting tht> word "discrimination" to mean the existence of "racial
imbalance," would "require" employers to grant preferential
treatment to minorities, and supporters responding that the
EEOC would be granted no such power and that, indeed, Title
VII prohibits discrimination "in favor of workers because· of
their race.'' Supporters of H. R. 7152 in the House ultimately
prevailed by a vote of 290 to 130, 11 and the measure was sent
to the Senate to begin what became the longest debate in that
body's history.
or acceptance. TherP i:; nothing whatever in this bill about racial balance
as appear,; so frequrntly in the minority report of 1he Committee.
" What the bill cloPs do is prohibit discrimination becau~e of race ...."
110 Cong. Rcr. 1540 (1964).
Represpntative MiniHh addrd: "Uuder title VII, employmrnt will be on
the baHis of ml:'rit, not of fa('(' . This ml:'ans that no quota systl:'m will be
set up, no on!:' will bl:' forced to hire incompl:'tent help because of race or
religion, and no one will be given a ve~ted right to demand l:'mployment
for certain jobs." ld ., at 1600. Representative Good!:'!!, answering the
charge that Title VII would be iuterpreted "to requirr e] a racial balance,"
id., at 2557, responded: "There i;; nothing here as a mattPr of legislative
history that would require racial balancing. . . . We are not talking about
a union having to balancl:' it;; ml:'mbership or an employer having to
balancr a number of employees. There is no quota involved. It is a
matter of an individual's right~ having been violatPd, charges having
bern brought, investigation carried out, and conciliation having been attempted and then proof in court that there was discrimination and a denial
of right>; on the basis of race or color." ld., at 2558. After H. R. 7152
had been passed and 8ent to the Senate, Republican supporters of the
bill in the Housr prepared an interpretative mrmorandum making clear
that " title VII does not permit the ordering of racial quotas in bu~ine~s
or unionti and does not permit interferences with seniority rights of em~
ployees or union m emberti.'' ld., at 6566 (emphasis added) .
u Eleven Members did not vote.
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B
The Senate debate was broken into three phases: the debate
on sending the bill to Committee, the general debate on the
bill prior to invocation of cloture, and the debate following
cloture.
1

When debate on the motion to refer the bill to Committee
opened, opponents of Title VII in the Senate immediately
echoed the fears expressed by their counterparts in the House,
as is demonstrated by the following colloquy between Senators
Hill and Ervin:
"Mr. ERVIN. I invite attention to ... Section [703
(a)l ....
"I ask the Senator from Alabama if the Commission
could not tell an employer that he had too few employees,
that he had limited his employment, and enter an order,
under [Section 703 (a)], requiring him to hire more persons, not because the employer thought he needed more
persons, but because the Commission wanted to compel
him to employ persons of a particular race.
"Mr. HILL. The Senator is correct. That power is
written into the bill. The employer could be forced to
hire additional persons . . . . " 110 Cong. Rec. 4764
( 1964) .15
15 Continuing with thrir exchange, Senators Hill and Ervin broached
the ~ubjrct of racial balance:
"Mr. ERVIN. So if the Commissioner ... should be joined by another
member of the Commis<ion in the finding that the Pmployer had too high
a percentage, in the Commi~~ion's judgment, of pPr~on~ of the Caucasian
race working in hi~ busine~:;, the~· cou ld makr the employer rither hirr, in
addition to hi::; present employees, an extra numbrr of Negro employees,
or compel him to fire Pmployers of the Caucasian mce in order to make a
place for N rgro emplo~·er::;?
"Mr. HILL. The Senator is correct, although the employrr might not
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Senator Humphrey, perhaps the primary moving force behind
H. R. 7152 in the Senate, was the first to state the proponents'
understanding of Title VII. Responding to a political advertisement charging that federal agencies were at liberty to
interpret the word "discrimination" in Title VII to require
racial balance, Senator Humphrey stated: "[T]he meaning
of racial or religious discrimiuation is perfectly clear. . . .
[I] t means a distinction and treatment given to different individuals because of their different race, religion, or national
origin." ld., at 5423. 10 Stressing that Title VII "does not
limit the employer's freedom to hire, fire, promote, or demote
need the additional emplo~·eeR, and although they miglJt bring his business
into bankruptcy." 110 Cong. Her. 4754 (1964).
Thi;;; virw was reitemtecl b~ · S<'nator Hobert::;on:
"It is contemplated by thiH title that the percentage of colored and white
populatio11 in a comnmnit~· ~hall be in similar percentages in every business e;:;tabli;:;hment that rmploys ov<'r 25 persons. Thus, if there were
10,000 colorrd p<•rsons in n city and 15,000 whites, an employer with 25 employee~ would, in order to ovrrcome racial imbalance, he requirPd to ha.ve
10 colored per~onnel and 15 white. And if by chance that employer had
20 colon•d <'mplo~·ee~. he would havr to fire 10 of them in ordrr to rectify
the sit uation , of cour~r, this work::; thP other way around where whites
would br firrd." ld., at 5092.
Srnator Humphrr~· intrrruptrd Senator Robertson's discussion, responding: "The bill does not require that at all. If it did, I would vote against
it. . . . Tlwro is no prrcrntagr quota." Ibid.
10 This view was reitrratrd two days later in tlw "Biparti~an Civil Rights
Newsletter" cli~trihuted to the Senate on March 19 by ::;upporter~ of

H. R '1152:
"3. Defining discrimination: Critic,; of the civil rights bill hnve charged
that the word "dJorrimination' i;; left undefined in tbr bill and therefore
the door is open for interpretation of this term accordmg to 'whim or
caprice.' .. .
"There i;; no sound ba:;is for uncertainty about the meaning of discrimination in the contrxl of the civil right;; biU . It means a distinction in
trratment givrn to different individuab becaw;e of their different race,
religion, or natwnal origin.'' l 10 Cong. Rec. 7477 (1964).
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for any reasons-or no reasons-so long as his action is not
based on race," Senator Humphrey further stated that
"nothing in the bill would permit any official or court to
require any employer or labor union to give preferential
treatment to any minority group." Ibid. 17
After 17 days of debate the Senate voted to take up the bill
directly, without referring it to a committee. !d., at 6455.
Consequently, there is no Committee Report in the Senate.

2
Formal debate on the merits of H. R. 7152 began on March
30, 1964. Supporters of the bill in the Senate had made
elaborate preparations for this second round. Senator Humphrey, the Majority Whip, and Senator Kuchel, the Minority
Whip, were selected as the bipartisan floor managers on the
entire civil rights bill. Responsibility for explaining and defending each important title of the bill was placed on bipartisan "captains." Senators Clark and Case were selected as the
bipartisan captains responsible for Title VII. Vass, Title
VII: Legislative History, 7 B. C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 431,
444-445 ( 1966) (hereinafter Title VII: Legislative History).
17

Earlier in the debate, Senator Humphrey had introduced a newspaper
article quoting the answers of a Justice Department "rxpert" to the "ten
most common objections to Title VII." Insofar as is pertinent here, the
article otated:
"Objection: The law would empower Federal 'inspectors' to require
emplo~·er::; to hire b~r race. White JWople would be fired to make room
for Negroes. Seniorit~· rights would be destro~·rd ....
"Reply: The bill requireH no such thing. The five-member Equal
Emplo)·ment Opportunity Commi:;sion that would be created would have
no power:; to order anything ....
" .. . The bill would not authorize anyone to order hiring or firing to
achieve racial or religious balance. An employer will remain wholly free
to hire on thr basi~ of hi~ needH nne! of the job candidate':; qualifications.
What is prohibitrd is the refusal to birr someone becau~e of hiH race or
religion . Similarly, the law will have no effect on union seniority rights."
110 Cong Rer. 5094 (1964).
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In the opening speech of tlw formal Senatr clebatr on the
bill, Aenator Humphrey addressed the main concern of Title
VII's opponents, advising that not only does Title VII not
require use of racial quotas, 'i t does not permit their use.
"The truth," stated the .floor leader of the bill, "is that this
title forbids discriminating against anyone on account of race.
'rhis is the simple and complete truth about title VII." ~10
Cong. Rec. 6549 (1964). Senator Humphrey continued:
"Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this
title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the
Commission or to any courts to require hiring, firing, or
promotion of rmployees in order to meet a racial 'quota'
or to achieve a certain racial balance.
"That bugaboo has been brought up to dozen times;
but it is nonexistent. In fact, the very opposite is true.
Title VI I prohibits discrirnin4tion. In effect, it says that
race, religion , and national origin are not to be used as
the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII is designed to
encouragP hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications,
not race or religion." Ibid. (emphasis added).
At the close of his speech, Senator Humphrey returned briefly
to the subject of employment quotas: "It is claimed that the
bill would require racial quotas for all hiring, when in fact it
provides that race shall not be a basis for making personnel
decisions." I d., at 6553.
Senator Kuchel delivered the second major speech in support of H. R. 7152. In addressing the concerns of the opposition , he observed that "[nlothing could be further from the
truth " than the charge that "Federal inspectors" would be
empowered under Title VII to dictate racial balance and preferential advancement of minorities. I d., at 6563. Senator
Kuchel emphasized that senority rights would in no way be
affected by Title VII: "Employers and labor organizations
could not discriminate in favor of or against a person because
of his race, his religion , or his national origin, In such mat-
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ters ... the bill now before us ... is color-blind." I d., at
6564 (emphasis added).
A few days later the Senate's attention focused exclusively
on Title VII, as Senators Clark and Case rose to discuss the
title of H. R. 7152 on which they shared floor "captain" responsibilities. In an interpretative memorandum submitted
jointly to the Senate, Senators Clark and Case took pains to
refute the opposition's charge that Title VII would result in
preferential treatment of minorities. Their words were clear
and unequivocal:
"There is no requirement in title VII that an employer
maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve a
violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance
would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on
the basis of race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual." I d., at 7213. 18
18

In obviouR rPference to the charge that the word " discrimination" in
Titlr VII would be intPrprPted by federal agmcies to mPan the absence of
racial halancP, thr intPrpretativr memorandum statPd:
"fSection 70:3] prohibits discrimination in employment brcause of race,
color, rrligion, ~rx, or national origin . It has be<"n suggPsted that the
conrrp! of rli ~c rimination i ~ vagur. In fact it i:; clear and simple and
ha:; no hiddrn m<"aning::;. To di~criminate is to makr a distinction, to
make :t differrnce in trrntment or favor, and tho:sr distinctions or differenr<"S in treatment 01' favor which are prohibit€'d by fSrction 703] arc
thoHr which are based on any five of thr forbiddrn critrria: race, color,
rrligion, SPx, or national origin." 110 Cong. Rcc. 7213 (1964) (rmphasis
add Pel).
Earlirr in hi;; sprrch, Srnator Clark introducrd a memorandum prepared at his requro;t hy thr Ju:sticr Department with tlw purpose of
rc;-;pondmg to critici,.;m~ of Titlr VII lrvri<"d by opponents of thr mra~ure,
part irularl~· S€'na tor Hill. With rega rrl to racial balan('f'. the Justice Departmrnt ~ tated :
"Finally, it has been as~rrted that title VII would impOR<' a rpquiremrn! for 'rarial .balance.' This i~ incorrect. TJ1erc is no provii:iion . .•
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Of particular relevance to the instant case were their observations regarding seniority rights. As if directing their comments at Brian Weber, the Senators said:
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights. lts effect is prospective and not retrospective.
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating
in the past and as a result has an all-white working force,
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation
would be simply to fill future vacancies 011 a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense
of the white workers hired earlier." Ibid. (emphasis
added). 19
in title VII ... that requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal
court to rPquire preferential treatment for an)· individual or any group
for the purpo::>e of achieving racial balance. . . . No rmployer is requirPd to maintain !Ill)' ratio of Negrors to whitPs. . . . On the contrary,
any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balanrr would almost certainly run afoul of title VII becau::;e it would involve a failure or refusal
to birr ~:;ome individual becau:-;e of hi~ race, color, religion. srx, or national
origin. What title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil right~:; bill
seek:-; to accompli8h i::; equultreatment for ull." !d .. at 7207.
10 A Ju::;tice Department memorandum earlier introduced by Senator
Clark , Rec n. 18, supra. expre:;::;ecl the ~ame view regarding Title VII's
impact on seniority right:; of employees:
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it.
take~ effect . . . . This would br true even in tht> ca:;e where owing to
discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had
more ~enioritr than Negroes. . . . [A]s:-;uming that seniority rights were
built up ovPr a period of time during which N egroe:-: were not hired, the:;c
right:-: would not be :>et a:;ide by the taking effect of title VII. Employers
unci labor organizations would simply be undrr a duty not to di:-:criminate
against Negroe:; because of their race." 110 Cong. Ree. 7207 (1964).
Thr interpretation of Title VII contamecl in the memoranda introduced
by Senator Clark totally refutes the Court's implied sugge~tion that
Title Vli would prohibit an employer from cli::;criminating on the basis
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Thus with virtual clairvoyance the Senate's leading supporters of Title VII anticipated precisely the circumstances of
this case and advised their colleagues that the type of minority
preference employed by Kaiser would violate Title VII's ban
on racial discrimination. To further accentuate the point,
Senator Clark introduced another memorandum dealing with
common criticisms of the bill, including the charge that racial
quotas would be imposed under Title VII. The answer was
of racP in order to maintain n racial balancP in hil'i work force, but would
permit him to do so in order to achieve racial balance. Sec ante, at 13,
:wd n. 7.
Tlw maintain-achieve distinction i~ analytically indrfen~ible in any pvent.
Apparently, the Court is saying that an employer i,.; free to achieve a
raciall~· balanced work forrp by discriminating against. whitE's, but that
onrP he has reached his goal, hP is no long freP to discriminate in ordpr
to maintain that racial balancE'. In other words, once Kaiser rPachPs its
goal of 39% minority representation in craft positions at thP Gramercy
plant, it can no longer consider race in admitting Pmployees into its on-thejob training programs, even if the program~ become as "all-white" as
the) were in April 1974.
Obviously, the Court is driven lo this illogical position by thr glaring
statement, quotPd in text, of Senators Clark and Case that "any deliberate
attempt to maintain a racial balance ... would involve a violation of Title
VII because maintaining such a bnlancr would require an employer to hire
or to refuse to hire on thr basi::; of race." 110 Cong. Rec. 7123 (1964)
( emphasic added). Achieving a crrtain racial balance, however, no less
t.han maintaining sueh a balance, would require an emplnyer to hire or to
refuse to hire on thP basis of race. Further, the Court'" own conclusion
that Title VII's legislative histor~', coupled with the wording of § 703 (j),
evinces a congre::;sional intent to leavr employers free to employ "private,
voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans," ante, at 12, is inconsi~tpnt with itt> maintain-achieve di~tinction. If Congress' primary purpose
in enarting Title VII was to open employment opportunities previously
clc.,;ed to :'\fegroei:l, it would seem to make little difference whether the
emplo~·er opening those opportunities w:>s arhieving or maintaining a certain rarial balance in his work force. Likewise, if ~ 703 (j) evinces Congre::;s' intent to permit Jmpo:;ition of race-conscious affirmative action plans,
it would ~eem to makP little difference whether the plan was adopted toa<"hie,·c or maintain the deHirrd racial balance.
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simple and to the point: 11 Quotas are themselves discriminatory." !d., at 7218.
Despite these clear statements from the bill's leading and
most knowledgeable proponents, the fears of the opponents
were not put to rest. Senator Robertson reiterated the view
that "discrimination" could be interpreted by a federal
"bureaucrat" to require hiring quotas. !d., at 7418-7420. 20
Senators Smathers aud Sparkman, while conceding that Title
VII does not in so many words require the use of hiring
quotas, repeated the opposition's view that employers would
be coerced to grant preferential hiring treatment to minorities
by agencies of the Federal Government. 21 Senator Williams
was quick to respond:
11
Those opposed to H. R. 7152 should realize that to hire
a Negro solely because he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a 'white only' employment policy.
Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by title VII
of this bill. The language of that title simply states that
race is not a qualification for employment. . . . Some
people charge that H. R. 7152 favors the Negro, at the
expense of the white majority. But how can the Ian20

Senator Robertson's observations prompted Senator Humphrey to
make the following offrr: "lf the Srnator can find in title VII ... any
language which provides that an employer will ha.ve to hire on the basis
of percentage or quota relaterl to color ... I will start eating the pages one
after anothrr, brcatt~E' it is not in there ." 110 Cong. RPc . 7420 (1964) .
21 R•P frrring to tilE' Equal Employment. Opportunity Commission, Sen.
ator SmathPrs arguPd that Title VII "would makE> posHiblr thr creation
of a Fedrntl hureaucracy which would , in the final analy~is, causE> a man
to hirE> someone whom he did not want to hire, not on the basis of ability,
but on tlw basis of rf'ligion , color, or creed .. .. " 110 Cong. Rec. 8500
(1964). Senator Sparkman's comments were to thr samp effect. Sre
n. 23, infra. Srveral othrr opponent;; of Titlr VII ('XprPss{'(l similar viPws.
See 110 Cong. Rec . 9034-9035 (1974) (mnark~ of Srn~. Stennis and
Tower), id., at 9943-9944 (remarks of Sens. Loug and Talmadge), id., at
10513 (remarb of Sen. Robcrt~on).
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guage of equality favor one race or one religion over
another?' Equality can have only one meaning, and that
meaning is self-evident to reasonable men. Those who
say that equality means favoritism do violence to common sense." !d., at 8921.
Senator Williams concluded his remarks by noting that Title
VII's only purpose is "the elimination of racial and religious
discrimination in employment." lbid. 22 On May 25, Senator Humphrey again took the floor to defend the bill against
"the well-financed drive by certain opponents to confuse and
mislead the American people." I d., at 11846. Turning once
again to the issue of preferential treatment, Senator Humphrey remained faithful to the view that he had repeatedly
expressed:
"The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in employment shall be given to Negroes or to any
other persons or groups. It does not provide that any
quota systems may be established to maintain racial balance in employment. In fact, the title would prohibit
preferential treatment for any particular group, and any
person , whether or not a member of any minority group,
would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory
employment practices." Id., at 11848 (emphasis added).
While the debate in the Senate raged, a bipartisan coalition
under the leadership of Senators Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey. and Kuchel was working with House leaders and representatives of the Johnson Administrati011 on a number of
amendments to H. R. 7152 designed to enhance its prospects
of passage. The so-called "Dirksen-Ma11sfield" amendment
22

Several other proponents of H. R . 7152 commented briefly on Title
VII, ob~rrving that it did not authorizr t hr imposition of quotas to correct
racial imbalaner. Sre 110 Cong. Rec . 9113 (1964) (remarks of Srn.
KPating), id., at 9881-9882 (remarks of Sen . Allott) , id .. at 10520 (rrmarks of Srn . Carl;,on) , id., at 11768 (rrmarks of Sen . McGovern).
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wa · intruduc!'d on ~lay 20 by ~Pnator Dirksen as a suhstitut<>
for tlw t•ntin• House-passed bill. The f'uhstitut<' bill, which
ultimatt'ly lwcanH• law. l<'ft Utichangt•tl the basic· prohihitol'y
langttal!<' of~~ 70:1 (a) and (d). as we•ll as tlw renwdial provisions itt ~ 70() (g). ft added. howPvrr. S<'VPral provisions defilling UIHI elarifying tlw :·ii'OP<' of Titk VII's suhstantivp pr·ohibitiuns. One· of tho~w ('Lt rifying anwndments, ~ 7o:3 ( .i). was
sp<'cifieally clin·ctcd Ht i h<' opposition'f' conct•rns rcganlillg
raeial balaneinf.!; and prPf<1 r• IJ tial tre>atnwnt of minoritiC's. pr·oviding in pertiti<'Ilt part: ":\uthing contained in I Title Vlll
!'lhall tw intrrpr<'t.e·d to n·quin• any employc·r . . . to grant
prderrntial trratnwt1t to aii:V individual or to any group becausr of th<' raec· ... of ~:11('h individual or group on account
of' a racial imbalance· in the• c•mployer's work force. 42
l-. ~ . C. ~ :2000<'-:2 t.i); quotc•d in full. at 11.,. s·upra.
Tlw Court draws from tlw languagP of ~ 70:3 (.i) primary
support for its c:onelusio n that Title VII's l.Jlanht prohibition
on racial discrimitiatioJJ i·t c·mploym<'nt does not prohibit prefprcntial treatme•11t of bJa ;· ks to eorrPct racial illlbah.tnef'. Alh.. ging that O]J]lOIWnts of T it]<> \'ff had argUC'd (1) that t]w act
would bP intc•rprrkd to n·quire <'lllployPrs with racially imbalaiiC<'d work forec·s to g1.111t prd<'rential tr<'atmrllt to minoritirs and ( 2) that ''pJnp]t lY<'I'I' with racially iml.JalaJiced \Vork
forces would gra 11 t prPfc•t 11tial trratmf:'ll t to racial minoritiPs,
even if 110t rc•quirc·d to do ~o by tht> .-\ct,'' ante, at D, the Court
COIICludc•R that ~ 7o:3 C.i) is r<>sponsiv<' only to the oppotiPnts'
first ol>jeetion and that Conl!:n'SR therefore• lllust have' intrnd<'cl
to perlllit volu11tary. privatr discrimination against whitt's iu
order to corrPct raeial iml>alaticc.
Contrary to the Court's :111alysis. the languag<' of ~ 70:3 (j)
is prc•cis<'ly tailorPd to th<' ob.i<•('tiotl voicrcl tinw a11d again hy
Title VII 's opponc·titR. ~ ~ot OIIC<:> duri11g the 83 days of dehatc
in tlw ~Pnatr did a S[Wak<•r. proponent or opponc·nt, suggPst
that the hill would allci\\ cn1ployc•rs voluntarily to prdC'r raeial
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minorities over white persons. 23 In light of Title VII's flat
prohibition on discrimination "against any individual . . .
because of such individual's race," § 703 (a), 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (a), such a contention would have been, in any
23 The Court rites the rPmarb of St>nator Sparkman in support of its
suggestion that opponents had argued that Pmployt>rs would take it upon
tht>mst>lves to balance their work forces by granting preferential treatment
to racial minorities. In fact, Senator Sparkman';,; comments accurately
rt>flected tht> opposition's "party lint>." He argued that while the language
of Title VII does not rxpressl~· rrquire imposition of racial quotas (no one,
of course, lutd ever argued to thr contrary), the law would be applit>d by
federal agencit>::; in ;,;uch a wn~ · that "some kind of quota system will be
m;rd." 110 Cong. Rec. 8619 (HJ64) . Srnator Sparkman';,; veiw is rrflected
in thr following t>xrhangt> with Senator Stennis:
"l'vir. SPARKMAN. At any rate, when the Governmrnt agent came
to intervirw an employer wlw had 100 persons in his employ, thr first
question would be, 'How many Nrgroe~ are you rmploying?' Suppose
the population of that area was 20 peremt Negro. Irrunrdiately the agent
would ~ay, 'You should h~ve at least 20 Negroes in your employ, and
they should be distributed~ among your supervisory personnel and in all
the other catrgories'; an the agent would insist that that be done
immediately.

"Mr. STENNIS . ...
"The Senator from Alabama has made very clear his point about employment on the quota basi . Would not the same ba::;is be applied to
promotions?
"Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly it would . As I have said, when the
Federal agcntR came to check on the situation in a small business which
had 100 rmployrrs, and when thr agrnts said to the employer, 'Yon must
hire 20 Negrors, and some of thE>m mu;,;t be E>mployed in supervisory caparitir~, ' and ~o forth , and so on, the agent would also say, 'And you must
promo1 E> thr Negroes, too, in order to distribute them evenly among
the varimtH ranks of yom employees.'" !d., at 8618 (empha;;is added).
Latrr in his rrmarb, Senator Sparkman stated: "Certainly thr suggestion
will br made to a ;;nnall bnsinrs~ that may havE> a small govE>rnmE>nt contract ... that if it doe~ not carry out the suggE>stion that has beE'n madr to
thE' company by an in;,;pector, its Govrrnment contract will not be renrwed ." Ibid. Exct>pt for the Hizt> of thE' busine:,;s, Srnator Sparkman
saw hiR prophecy fnlfillrd in this case.
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event, too preposterous to warrant respouse. Indeed, speakers
on both sides of the issue, as the legislative history makes
clear, recognized that Title VII would tolerate no voluntary
racial preference, whether in favor of blacks or whites. The
complaint consistently voiced by the opponents was that Title
VII, particularly the word "discrimination." would be interpreted by federal agencies such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to require the correction of racial
imbalance through the granting of preferential treatment to
minorities. Verbal assurances that Title VII would not require-indeed, would not permit--preferential treatment of
blacks having failed, supporters of H. R. 7152 responded by
proposing an amendment carefully worded to meet, and put
to rest, the opposition's charge. Indeed, unlike~~ 703 (a) and
(d), which are by their terms directed at entities-e. g., employers, labor unions-whose actions are restricted by Title
VII 's prohibitions, the language of § 703 (j) is specifically directed at entities-federal agencies and courts-charged with
the responsibility of interpreting Title VII's provisions. 24
Iu light of the background and purpose of § 703 (j), the
irony of invoking the section to justify the result in this case
is obvious. The Court's frequent references to the "voluntary" nature of Kaiser's racially discriminatory admission
quota bear no relationship to the facts of this case. Kaiser
and the Steelworkers acted under pressure from an agency of
the Federal Government, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, which found that minorities were being "underutilized" at Kaiser's plants. See Jl. 2, supra. That is, Kaiser's
work force was racially imbalanced. Bowing to that pressure,
Kaiser instituted an admissions quota preferring blacks over
whites, thus confirming that the fears of Title VII's opponents
~ 1 Compare

ful

§ 702 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000<'-2 (a) ("Ii Rhall br nn unlnwpracticf' for an employer . . . .") with § 70:3 (j) , 42

cmplo~·mrn1

F. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j) (''Nothing containC'd in this Hnbchapter shall be
intrrpreted .... " ) .
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were well founded. Today § 703 (j), adopted to allay those
fears, is invoked by the Court to uphold imposition of a racial
quote. m1der the very circumstances that the section was
intended to prevent. 25
Sect:on 703 ( j) apparently calmed the fears of most of the
opponents; after its introduction complaints concerning racial
balance and preferential treatment died down considerably. 20
~ In ~upport of its rending of § 703 (j), the Court argues thnt "a prollibition again~t all voluntary, mcc-con~cious, affirmative action efforts
would dioservP" the important policy, Pxpressed in the House Report on
H . R . 7152 , that Title VII lenve "management prProgatives nnd union
freedoms . . . undisturbed to the greatest extent po:ssible'' H. R. Rep.,
Part II, at 29, quoted ante, at 10. The Court thus conCludes that "Congre:ss did not intend to limit traditional bu:siness freedom to such a degree
as to prohibit all voluntnry, race-c<mscious affirmative action." Ante,
at 11.
The oentences in the House Report immediate>ly following the statemf'nt
quoted by the Court, however, belie the Court':> conclusion:
"Internnl affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interferf'd with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices. Its primary task is to makf' certain that tlw chanuels of employment are open to per:sors regardless of their race and that
jobs in companies or membership in unions arf' strictly filled on thf' basis
of qualification.'' H. R. Rep., Part II, at 29 (Pmphnsis added).
2

Thuo, the> Hou~e Report invoked b~· the Court is prefectly com;istent with
the countless obsPrvations el::;ewherc in Title VII'o voluminous legi~lativc
history that rmployero are free to make employmPnt dPci:sions without
go··ernmental interference, so long as those decision:; arc made without
regard to race. The whole purpooe of Titlf' VII waH to df'prive employers
of their "traditional business freedom" to discriminate on the basis of
race. In this case, the "channels of employment" at KaiRer were hardly
"open " to Brian Weber.
26 Some of the opponpnts still wen• not satisfied.
For example, Senator
Ervin of North Carolina continued to maintain that Title VII "would give
the FPderal Government the power to go into any buoinPoi> or industry
in the United Statei:i . .. and tell the opprator of that business whom he
had to hirr." 110 CoDg. Rec. 1:3077 (1964). Senators R.u::;sell and Byrd
remained of thP view that pre:ssures exerted by federal agencies would
co111pPt elt1l)lO~"N::; .;to give .priot·it~· defiDitely and almo::>t completely, in
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Proponents of the bill, however, continued to reassure the
opposition that its concerns were unfounded. In a lengthy
defense of the entire civil rights bill, Senator Muskie emphasized that the opposition's "torrent of words ... cannot obscure
this basic, simple truth: Every American citizen has the right
to equal treatment-not favored treatment, not complete
individual equality-just equal treatment." 110 Collg. Rec.
12614 (1964). With particular reference to Title VII. Senator Muskie noted that the measure "seeks to afford to all
Americans equal opportunity in employment without discrimination. Not equal pay, not 'racial balance.' Only equal
opportunity." ld., at 12617. 27
Senator Saltonstall. Chairman of the Republican ConfereHce of Senators participa.ting in the drafting of the DirksenMansfield amendment, spoke at length on the substitute bill.
He advised the Senate that the Dirksen-Mansneld substitute,
which included § 703 (j), "provides no preferential treatment
for any group of citizens. In fact, it specifically prohibits
such treatment." ld., at 12691 (emphasis added).~
8

tnotit in~tnnce:;, to the members of the minority group." Jd., at 13149
(remark~ of Sen. Bussell).
27 Senator l\luskie also addres~ed the charge that federa l agencies would
equate "di:;crimination," as that word is 11Hed in Title VII, with "racial
balance":
"Some of the opposition to t hi:; title has been based upon its alleged
vaguene:;:; rand] it:; failurr to dt>finc ju~t what is meant by di~rrimi
nation . . . . I submit that, on either count, the oppo:;ition is not well
taken . Discrimination in thi,; bill means just what it mean;; anywhPrc: a
diHtinrtion in treatmrnt given to differ<'Ilt individual,; brcm.ISP of their
race . . . and, a,; a practical matter , WP all know what con:;titutes racial
di;,;rrimination ." 110 Con~. Bee. 12617 (1964).
Srnator Mu~kie then revirwrd thP variou~ provisions of § 703, concluding
that thr~· "provide a clear and definitivr indication of the typP of practice
which this tit lr ;;eek:; to eliminatr. Any ~erious doubts concerning I Title
VII'o] application would, it RePm~ to mr, stem at leaHt partially from the
prediHpo~ition of the JWr~on expre:;;;ing ~ncb doubt." ld. , at 12618.
28 The Court · tate~ that rongrrssional commrnts regarding § 703 (j)

78- 432, 78-435 & 78-436-DISSENT

STEELWORKERS v. WEBER

31

On June 9, Senator Ervin ofi'ered an amendment that
would entirely delete Title VII from the bill. In answer to
Senator Ervin's contention that Title VII "would make the
members of a particular race special favorites of the laws,"
id., at 13079, Senator Clark rE-torted:
"The bill does not makE' anyone higher than anyone
else. It establishes no quotas. It leaves an employer
free to select whomever he wishes to employ ....
"All this is subject to one qualification. and that quali·
fication, is to state: 'In your activity as an employer ...
you must not discriminate because of the color of a man's
skin .... '
~~'fhat is all this provision does. . . . It nwrely says,
'When you deal in interstate commerce, you must not dis·
criminate on the basis of race .... '" !d., at 13080.
The Ervin amendment was defeated. and the Senate turned
its attention to an amendment proposed by Senator Cotton
to limit application of Title VII to employers of at least 100
employees. During the course of the Senate's deliberations on
the amendment. Senator Cotton had a revealiug discussion
with Senator Curtis. also an opponent of Title VII. Both
men expressed dismay that Title VII would prohibit prefer·
"werC' all lo thC' effPct tlwt rmployC'rs would not br required to in~.titute
prrfprpntial (]uolas to avoid TitiP VII liabilit)·." Ante. at 11 n. 7 (Pmpha;;is in original). Senator Saltcustall's statrment that Title VII of the
Dirk:-;en-Man;;firld f>Ubst itu1C', which rontained § 703 (j), "Hpecifically prohibit::;" prrferential treatment for any racial group di::;proves the Court's
obsrrvation. Further, in a major statement. explaining thr purpose of the
Dirben-:\Jansfield ;,;ubstitulC' ameudmC'nts, Senator HumJ)hre)' said of
§ 70:~ (j): '' Thi~ ~ub:-;C'ct ion doC'~ not rrprC'sent any change in the substance
of tlw titlP. It does state clear!)· and accurately what we havC' mpntioned
all along about thr bill '::; intent and meaning." 110 Cong. Hec. 12723
(1964). What Senator Humphrey had " mrntioned all along about the
hiii'H intent and meaning," was that it neither requirPd no1' permitted
impo::;ition of preferential quoins to eliminate racial imhalanres.
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ential hiring of "members of a minority race in order to
enhance their opportunity":
"Mr. CURTIS. Ts it not the opinion of the Senator
that any individuals who provide jobs for a class of people who have perhaps not had sufficient opportunity for
jobs should be commended rather than outlawed?
"Mr. COTTON. Indeed it is." !d., at 13086. 20
20

The romjllei e exchange hei ween Senators Cotton and Curtis, insofar
as is pert inrn t here, is a::; follows:
" Mr. COTTO~ ....
''I would a~::;ume that anyonr who will administrr the laws in future
yrars will not di::;criminatr betwrrn the race;;. If I were a Nrgro, and by
dint of rducation, training, and hard work I had ama::;. ed enough property
a:; a regro ::;u that I had a bu::;ines.~ of my own-and thrr!' arr many of
them in this countr~·-and I felt that, having made a succe;;;; of it myself,
I wanted to help people of my own race to step up a~ I had :;tepprd up,
I think I t>hould have thr right to do ,:o. I think I f'houlcl have the right
to employ Negror,; in my own rstabli~hmen i and put out a lwlping hand
to them if I :;o clr,;irPd. I do not belirve that anyone in Washington
should be prrmittl'd to come in and Hay, 'You cannot employ all Negroes.
You must have some Poles. You muHt have some Yankees.' ...

" Mr. CURTIS ....
"The Senator mad!' refrr!'nCP to the fact that a mrmber of a minority
rae<" might brcome an employrr and :;boule! have a right to employ mem-

ber:; of his racr in order to givr them opportunit~· . Would not the same
thing follow, that a membrr of n majority race might wi,;h to employ
almo;;t entirely, or entirely , members of a minority race in order to cnhancr thrir opportunity? And is it not true that under title VII as
written, that would ron~tiiute rli~;crimination?
"Mr. COTTON .. . .
" It crrtainly would, if ;;omronr complainrd about it and felt that he
had bern deprived of a job, and that it had be('[) given to a membrr of a
minorit r racr brcau,;e of his race aucl uot because of ~omr other rrason."
110 Cong. Bee. 13086 (1964) .
This rolloquy refuir:; thr Court'::; ~iutrment thai ·' [t]herr was no :;uggc;;tion aftrr the adoption of § 703 (j) that wholly voluntary, race-con:;cious
affirmative action efforts would in them:;elves com;titutc a violation of
Title VII.'' Ante, at J2 n . 7.
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rrh us iu the only exchange on the Senate floor raising the possibility that an employer might wish to reserve jobs for minorities in order to assist thrm in overcoming their employment
disadvantage, both speakers concluded that Title VII prohibits such. in the words of the Court, "voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy." Ante, at 9. Immediately after
this discussion, both Senator Dirksen aud Senator Humphrey
took the floor in defcuse of thP 25-employee limit contained
in the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute bill, and neither Senator
disputed the conclusions of Senators Cotton and Curtis. The
Cotton amendment was defeated.

3
On June 10 the Senate 1 for the second time in its history,
imposed cloture on its membf'rs. The limited debate that
followed centered on proposed amendments to the DirksenMansfield substitute. Of some 24 proposed amendments,
only 5 were adopted.
As the civil rights bill approached its final vote, several supporters rose to urge its passage. Senator Muskie adverted
briefly to the issue of preferential treatment: "It has been
said that the bill discriminates against the Negro at the expense of the rest of us. lt seeks to do nothing more than to
lift the Negro from the status of inequality to one of equality
of treatment." 110 Cong. Rec. 14328 (1964) (emphasis
added). Senator Moss in a speech delivered on the day that
the civil rights bill was finally passed, had this to say about
quotas :
" The bill docs not accord to any citit~cn advantage or
preference- it docs not fix quotas of employment or
school population- it does force personal association.
What it does is to prohibit public officials and those who
invite the public generally to patronize their businesses
or to apply for employrnent, to utilize the offensive,
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humiliating, and cruel practice of discrimination on the
basis of race. In short, the bill does not accord special
consideration; it establish<'s equality." I d., at 14484
(emphasis added).
Later that day, June 19. the issue was put to a vote, and the
Dirksen-Mansfielcl substitute bill was passed.

c
The Act's return engagement in the House was brief. The
Hous<' Committee on Rules reported the Senate version without amendments on June 30, 1964. By a vote of 289 to 126,
the House adopted House Resolution 789. thus agreeing to
the Seuate's amendments of H. R. 7152.ao Later that same
day, July 2, the Presiclen t signed the bill and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 became law.

IV
Reading the language of Title VII, as the Court purports
to do, "agaiust the background of Lits] legislative history ...
and the historical context from which the Act arose," ante, at
6, oue is led inescapably to the conclusion that Congress fully
understood what it was saying and meaut precisely what it
said. Opponents of the civil rights bill did not argue that
30 Only three Con~J:re::;smen Rpoke to the i::<Hue of racial quotas during the
HouHe'" dt>bate on th() St>nate amendments. Hepre::;ent ative Lincl~ay
Alated: ''LWJe wish to emphaRizr that this bill does not r('quire quohu;,
racial balance, or an.\' of the other thing~ that tlw opponent~ have beeu
~aying about. it." 110 Cong. Rec. 15876 (1964). Hrpn'sentative McCollngh crho<>d thi8 und<>r;-;tanding, n•marking that ''[t]he hill doe::; not
permit the Fedcrnl Government to rPquire an emplo~· cr or union to hire
or accPpt for membrr::;hip a quota for person::; from a particular minority
group." /d., at 15H93. Th<> remarh of HeprP~rntativr 1IarGregor,
quoted by the C'onrt, antP, at 12 n. 7, are singularly unhelpful. He merely
uoted that by adding § 7G:3 (j) to Title VII of the HouHe bill, " I t]hc
Sen at c ... :spelled out Lthe House's I intentions morE' specifically." /d.,.

at 15893·,
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employers would be permitted under Title VII voluntarily to
grant preferential treatment to minorities to correct racial
imbalance. The plain language of the statute too clearly
prohibited such racial discrimination to admit of any doubt.
They argued , tirelessly, that Title VII would be interpreted
by federal agencies and their agents to require unwilling employers to racially balance their work forces by granting preferential treatment to minorities. Supporters of H. R. 7152
responded , equally tirelessly, that the Act would not be so
interpreted because not only does it not require preferential
treatment of minorities, it does not perrnit preferential treatment of any race for any reason. It cannot be doubted that
the proponents of Title VII understood the meaning of their
words, for "[s]eldom has similar legislation been debated with
greater consciousness for the need for 'legislative history' or
with greater care in the making thereof. to guide the courts
in interpreting and applying the law." Title VII: Legislative
History, at 444.
To put an end to the dispute, supporters of the civil rights
bill drafted and introduced ~ 703 ( j). Specifically addressed
to the opposition's charge, ~ 703 (.i) simply enjoins federal
agencies and courts from interpreting Titl0 VII to require
an em.11loyer to prefer certain racial groups to correct imbalances in his work force. Th0 section says nothing about
voluntary preferential treatment of minorities because such
racial discrimination is plainly proscribed by ~ ~ 703 (a) and
(d). Indeed, hacl Congress intended to except voluntary,
race-co11scious preferential treatment from the blanket prohibition on racial discrimination in ~~703(a) and (d), it
surely could have drafted language better suited to the task
than ~ 703 (j). ft knew how. Section 703 (i) provides:
"Nothing contai11ed in I title VII] shall apply to any
businrss or rnterprise on or near an Indian reservation
with respect to any publicly announced employment
practicr of such business or entprprisc under which a
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preferential treatment is given to any individual because
he is an Indian living on or near a reservation." § 703
(i), 42 U.S. C. § 2000e- 2 (i).

v
Our task in this case, like any other case involving the construction of a statute. is to give effect to the intent of Congress. To Jivine that iutent. we traditionally look first to the
words of the statute and. if they are unclear. then to the
statute 's legislative history. Finding the desired result hopelessly foreclosed by thesr conventional sources. the Court
turns to a third source-the "spirit'' of the Act. But close
examination of what the Court proffc>rs as the spirit of the Act
reveals it as the spirit animating the present 1najority. not the
Eighty-eighth Congress. For if the spirit of the Act eludes
the cold words of the statute itself. it rings out with unmistakable clarity in the words of the elected representatives who
made the Act law. Tt is equality. Renator Dirksen, I think,
captured that spirit in a speech delivered on the floor of the
Senate just moments beforr the bill was passed:
1

[ T] oday we come to grips finally with a bill that
a<.lvances the enjoyment of living; but. more than that,
it advances the equality of opportunity.
"I do not emphasize the word 1equality' standing by
itself. It means equality of opportunity in the field of
rclucation. Tt mean equality of opportunity in thP field
of employment. It means equality of opportunity in the
field of participation iu the affairs of government . . . .
"That is it.
"Equality of opportunity, if we are going to talk about
conscienc('. is the mass conscience of mankind that speaks
in every generation, and it will continue to speak long
after we are dead and gone." 110 C'ong. Rec. 14510
(1964) .
'

There is perhaps no clevicr more destructive to the notion
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of equality than the 11urnerus clausus-the quota. Whether
described as "benign discrimination'' or "affirmative action,"
the racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged
sword that must demean one in order to prefer another. In
passing Ti tie VII C'ongress outlawed all racial discrimination,
recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign,
that no action disadvantaging a person because of his color is
affirmative. With toclay's holding. the Court introduces into
Titlt' VII a tolerance for the> very .evil that the law was intended to eradicate. without offering even a clue as to v.·hat
the limits on that tolerance may be. ·we are told simply that
Kaiser's racial discriminatory admission quota "falls on the
pcrmissiblP side of the line. '' Ante, at 12. By going not.
merely beyond, but directly against Title VII's language and
legislative history. the Court has sown the wind. Later courts
will face tlw impossible task of reaping the whirlwind.
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MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
While I share some of the misgivings expressed in MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent, post, concerning the extent to
which the legislative history of Title VII clearly supports the
result the Court reaches today, I believe that additional considerations, practical and equitable, only partially perceived,
if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, support the conclusion reached by the Court today, and I therefore join its
opinion as well as its judgment..

I
In his dissent from the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Wisdom pointed out
that this case arises from a practica.l problem in the administration of Title VII. The broad prohibition again st discrimination places the employer and the union on what he accurately described as a "high tightrope without a net beneath
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them." 563 F. 2d 216, 230. If Title VII is read literally, on
the one hand they face liability for past discrimination against
blacks, and on the other they face liability to whites for any
voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior
discrimination against blacks.
In this case, Kaiser denies prior discrimination but concedes
that its past hiring practices may be subject to question. Although the labor force in the Gramercy area was approximately 39% black, Kaiser's work force was less than 15%
black, and its craft work force was less than 2% black. Kaiser
had made some effort to recruit black painters, carpenters,
insulators, and other craftsmen, but it continued to insist that ,
those hired have five years prior industrial experience, a requirement that arguably was not sufficiently job-related to
justify under Title VII any discriminatory impact it may have
had. See Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575
F. 2d 1374, 1389 (CAS 1978), cert. denied, U. S. (1979). The parties dispute the extent to which black craftsmen were available in the local labor market. They agree,
however, that after critical reviews from the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance. Kaiser and the Steelworkers established
the training program in question here and modeled it along
the lines of a Title VII consent decree later entered for the
steel industry. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F. 2d 826 (CA51976). Yet when they did
this, respondent Weber sued, alleging that Title VII prohibited the program because it discriminated against him as a
white person and it was not supported by a prior judicial finding of discrimination against blacks.
Respondents' reading of Title VII. endorsed by the Court
of Appeals, places voluntary compliance with Title VII in
profound jeopardy. The only wa.y for the employer and the
union to keep their footing on the "tightrope" it creates would
be to eschew all forms of voluntary affirmative action. Even
a whisper of emphasis on minority recruiting would be forbidden. Because Congress intended to encourage private
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efforts to come into compliance with Title VII, see Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974) , Judge Wisdom
concluded that employers and unions who had committed
"arguable violations" of Title VII should be free to take reasonable responses without fear of liability to whites. 563
F. 2d, at 230. The United States takes a similar position
here. Brief for United States 35. Preferential hiring along
the lines of the Kaiser program is a reasonable response for
the employer, whether or not a court, on these facts, could
order the same step as a remedy. The company is able to
avoid identifying victims of past discrimination , and so avoids
claims for backpay that would inevitably follow a response
limited to such victims. If past victims should be benefited
by the program, however, the company mitigates its liability
to those persons. Also, to the extent that Title VII liability
is predicated on the effect of a.n employer's past hiring prac-~
tices, the program makes it less likely that a "dispara.te effect"
could be demonstrated. Cf. County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
U.S.-, - , 1979) (hiring could moot a past Title VII
claim). And the Court has recently held that work force
statistics resulting from private affirmative action were probative of benign intent in a "disparate treatment" case.
Furnco Construction Corp . v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 579~580
(1978) .
The "arguable violation" theory has a number of advantages. It responds to a practical problem in the administra-;
tion of Title VII not anticipated by Congress. It draws
predictability from the outline of present law, and closely
effectuates the purpose of the Act. Both Kaiser and the
United States urge its adoption here. Because I agree that it
is the soundest way to approach this case, my preference
would be to resolve this litigation by applying it and holding
that Kaiser's craft training program meets the requirement
that voluntary affirmative action be a reasonable response 4>
an "arguable Violation" of Title VII.
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II
The Court, however, declines to consider the narrow "arguable violation" approach and adheres instead to an interpretation of Title VII that permits affirmative action by an employer whenever the job category in question is "traditionally
segregated." Ante, at 13, and n. 9. The sources cited suggest that the Court considers a job category to be "traditionally segregated" when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in
a persistent dispa.r ity between the proportion of blacks in the
labor force and the proportion of blacks among those who hold
jobs within the category.*
"Traditionally segregated job categories," where they exist,
sweep far more broadly than the class of "arguable violations"
of Title VII. The Court's expansive approach is somewhat
*The jobs in question here include those of carpenter, electrician, general repairman, insulator, machinist, and painter. App. 165. The sources
cited, ante, at 2 n. 1, establish, for example, that although 11.7% of the
United States population in 1970 wal:i black, the percentage of blacks
among the mr<nbership of carpenters' unions waiS only 3.7%. - For painters,
the percentage was 4.9, and for electricians, 2.6. United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Challenge Ahead: Equal Opportunity in Referral Unions 274, 281 (1976). Kaiser's Director of Equal Opportunity
Affairs testified that, as a result of discrimination in employment and
training opportunity, blacks were underrepresented in skilled crafts "in
every industry of the United States, and in every area of the United
States." App. 90. While the parties dispute the cause of the relative
underrepresentation of blacks in Kaiser's craft work force, the Court of
Appeals indicated that it thought "the general lack of skills among available blacks" was responsible. 563 F. 2d, at 224 n. 13. There can be
little doubt that any lack of skill has its roots m purposeful discrimination
of the pas~, including segregated and inferior trade schools for blacks in
Lou:siana, 'United States Commission on Civil Rights, 50 States Report 209
(1961); traditionally all-white craft unions in that State, including the
electrical workers and the plumbers, id., at 208; union nepotism, Local 53,
Asbestos Workers v. Vogler , 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5 1969); and segregated
apprenticeship programs, R. Marshall and V. Br1ggs, The Negro and
Apprenticeship 28 (1967).
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disturbing for me because, as MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST points
out, the Congress that passed Title VII probably thought it
was adopting a principle of nondiscrimination that would
apply to blacks and whites alike. While setting aside that
principle can be justified where necessary to advance statutory policy of encouraging reasouable responses as a form of
voluntary compliance that mitigates "arguable violations,"
discarding the principle of nondiscrimination where no countervailing statutory policy exists appears to be at odds with
the bargin struck when Title VII was enacted.
A closer look at the problem, however, reveals that in each
of the principal ways in which the Court's "traditionally segregated job categories'' approach expands on the "arguable viola.tions" theory, still other considerations point in favor of the
broad standard adopted by the Court, and make it possible
for me to conclude that the Court's reading of the statute is
an acceptable one.
A. The first point at which the Court departs from the
"arguable violations" approach is that it measures an individual employer's capacity for affirmative action solely in terms
of a statistical disparity. The individual employer need not
have engaged in discriminatory practices in the past. While,
under Title VII, a mere disparity may establish a prima facie
case against an employer, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S.
321,329- 331 (1977), it would not conclusively prove a violation of the Act. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324,
339-340, n. 20 (1977); see§ 703 (j), 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e- 2 (j).
As a practica.I matter, however, this difference may not be
that great. While the "arguable violation" standard is conceptually satisfying, in practice the emphasis would be on
"ar11:uable" rather than on "violation." The grea.t difficulty
in the District Court was that no one had any incentive to
prove that Kaiser had violated the Act. Neither Kaiser nor
the Steelworkers wanted to establiEh a past violation, nor did
Weber. The blacks harmed had never sued and so had no
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established representative. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission declined to intervene, and cannot be expected to intervene in every case of this nature. To make
the "arguable violation" standard work, it would have to be
set low enough to permit the employer to prove it without
obligating himself to pay a damage award. The inevitable
tendency would be to avoid hairsplitting litigation by simply
concluding that a mere disparity between the racial composition of the employer's work force and the composition of the
qualified local labor force would be an "arguable violation,"
even though actual liability could not be established on that
basis alone, See Note. 57 N. C. L. Rev. 695, 714-719 (1979).
B. The Court also departs from the "arguable violation"
approach by permitting an employer to redress discrimination
that lies wholly outside the bounds of Title VII. For example, Title VII provides no remedy for pre-Act discrimination,
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299,
309-310 (1977); yet the purposeful discrimination that
creates a "traditionally segregated job category" may have
entirely predated the Act. More subtly, in assessing a prima
facie case of Title VII liability, the composition of the employer's work force is compared to the composition of the poo1
of workers who meet valid job qualifications. Hazelwood,
433 U. S., at 308, and n. 13; Teamsters v. United States, 431
U. S., at 339-340, and n. 20 (1977). When a "job category"
is traditionally segregated. however, that pool will reflect the
effects of segregation, and the Court's approach goes further
and permits a comparison with the composition of the labor
force as a whole, in which minorities are more heavily
represented.
Strong considerations of equity support an interpretation
of Title VII that would permit private affirmative action to
reach where Title VII itself does not. The bargain struck in
1964 with the passage of Title VII guaranteeu equal opportunity for white and black alike, but wlwre Title VII provides
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no remedy for blacks, it should not be construed to foreclose
private affirmative action from supplying relief. It seems
unfair for respondent Weber to argue, as he does, that the
asserted scarcity of black craftsmen in Louisiana, the product
of historic discrimination, makes Kaiser's training program
illegal because it ostensibly absolves Kaiser of all Title VII
liability. Brief for Respondents 60. Absent compelling evidence of legislative intent, I would not interpret Title VII
itself as a means of "locking in" the effects of segregation
for which Title VII provides no remedy. Such a construction,
as the Court points out, ante, at 9, would be "ironic," given
the broad remedial purposes of Title VII.
The dissent, while it focuses more on what Title VII does
not require than on what Title VII forbids, cites several passages that appear to express an intent to "lock in" minorities.
In mining the legislative history anew, however, the dissent,
in my view, fails to take proper account of our prior cases that
have given that history a much more limited reading than
that adopted by the dissent. For example, in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-436, and n. 11 (1971) , the Court
refused to give controlling weight to the memorandum of
Senators Clark and Case which the dissent now finds so persuasive. See post, at 21-24. And in quoting a statement
from that memorandum that an employer would not be "permitted . .. to prefer Negroes for future vacancies/' post, at
22, the dissent does not point out that the Court's opinion in
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 349-351 (1977) ,
implies that that language is limited to the protection of established seniority systems. Here seniority is not in issue because the craft training program is new and does not involve
an abrogation of pre-existing seniority rights. In short, the
passages marshaled by the dissent are not so compelling as to
merit the whip hand over the obvious equity of permitting
employers to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination for
which Title VII provides no direct relief.
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III
I also think it significant that, while the Court's opinion
does not foreclose other forms of affirmative action, the Kaiser
program it approves is a moderate one. ·The opinion notes
that the program does not afford an absolute preference for
blacks, and that it ends when the racial composition of Kaiser's craft work force matches the racial composition of the
local population. It thus operates a.s a temporary tool for
remedying past discrimination without attempting to "maintain" a previously achieved balance. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 342 n. 17 (1978)
(BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Because the duration of the program is finite, it perhaps will end
even before the "stage of maturity when action along this line
is no longer necessary." Id., at 403 (BLACKMUN, J.). And
if the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may
set a different course if it so chooses.
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Chief,
The enclosed editorial from The Virginian-Pilot
was written by J. Wilkinson, a former clerk who is now
editor of the Pilot.
The Virginian-Pilot, published in Norfolk, has
the largest
,,. circulation of any state paper.
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The observations about Weber ::,'a r'e quite
l.io,. ~
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Enclosure:
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Richmond, Virginia 23226
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Racial Quotas

The Supreme Court approved on
Wednesday the use of racial quotas
by private employers to bring more
blacks into skilled jobs.
Minority groups were jubilant.
NAACP Executive Director Benjamin Hooks called the court's ruling
"probably the most important civilrights decision in recent history."
President Vilma S. Martinez of the
Mexican-American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund termed it tremendous for Hispanics, "soon to be
the nation's largest minority." A
long list of would-be quota beneficiaries lined up to applaud.
The facts of this momentous ruling
are simple. Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation agreed with
. its union, the United Steelworkers of
America, to reserve 50 percent of the
Brian Weber I
openings in a training skills program
I
for blacks. In the first year of the
whether numerical quotas are the
plan, Kaiser selected seven blacks
right way to overcome this nation's
and six whites for the program. The
shameful legacy of racial discrimimost junior black· selected had less
nation. We believe they are not.
seniority than several whites who .
For one thing, they breed hO":>lility.
h~d been rejected, including one
Whites rejected for employment or
~rian Weber.
admission to a university tend to
So Weber brought suit, claiming .blame that fact on special preferreverse racial discrimination. The
ences for blacks. The racial resentSupreme Court scotched his claim .. ment generated will be just as
The law now is that private employunhealthy in the long run as that iners may "voluntarily" utilize "beflicted in the past by our indefensible
nign" racial quotas more easily than
segregation laws.
universities supported by federal
For another thing, quotas tend to
funds.
afflict minority achievement ~;th a
;~ The tricky word in the court's lexipresumption of charity. Some people
con is, of course, "voluntary." With
always assume-wrongly-{hat the
the court's imprimatur now on racial
only reason this or that black person
quotas in the marketplace, employis in professional school or a top
ers are going to start feeling federal
management post is because of raand minority pressures not so reacli- cial preference. That is a racially dely characterized as "voluntary."
grading notion which quotas are only
The real question, however, is
helping to perpetuate.
~

Fronk Botten
Chairman

J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill

Page AIO

..

Perry Morgan

Just who will benefit from quotas
in' education or employment?
Blacks? Hispanics? Women? Filipinos? Chinese Americans? Irish
Americans? Appalachian whites? Italian Americans? American Indians? Though this nation's wrongs
against blacks are unique in severity, that will not stop others from
pressing their claims. As a result of
the court's ruling, we may anticipate
a scramble for preferred status in
which gracious losers will be few.
Where quotas will leave notions of
qualification and merit is difficult to
say. But it is dangerous for a nation
to assert that one's ethnic- or racial
affiliation should eclipse individual
merit. "In a society in which men
and women expect to succeed by
hard work and to better themselves
by making themselves better, it is no
trivial moral wrong to proceed systematically to defeat this expectation . . . . To reject an applicant who
meets established, realistic, and unchanged qualifications in favor of a
less qualified candidate is morally
wrong, and in the aggregate, practi- ,
cally disastrous." So wrote Yale law
professor Alexander Bickel shortly
before his death.
Justice Lewis Powell suggested
last summer in the Bakke case a far
saner means of achieving an integrated society than the one the court
approved this week. Universities
could acknowledge an individual's
race or disadvantaged background in
their decisions, said he, but not set
aside a specified number of places
on racial or ethnic grounds.
May his advice yet be heeded. We
shall not hear the last of this debate
for a very long time.

